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PARTIAL TERMINATION OF SINGLE-EMPLOYER TAX
QUALIFIED PLANS: CLARITY OR MISAPPROPRIATED
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING?
Jo Ann C. Petroziello*
Samantha J. Prince*
INTRODUCTION
For over three decades, the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter
I.R.C. or Code]' has contained provisions that require that all benefits
in a single-employer tax qualified plan become fully vested when the
plan is partially terminated. However, the Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter IRS or Service] has failed to articulate a standard for de-
termining when a partial termination has occurred. Instead, the courts
and the Service have utilized a "facts and circumstances" test which
does not set clear guidelines. In light of the application of inconsistent
approaches by the courts, recent decisions answering partial plan termi-
nation questions have served only to further complicate the issues. The
result of this evolution is a body of law that contains relatively few
"bright line rules" on which employee benefits practitioners can rely.
This article examines the statutory, legislative and case history of
partial terminations of single-employer tax qualified plans. It discusses
an employer's ability to terminate single-employer plans prior to the
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(hereinafter ERISA) as well as post-ERISA and thoroughly analyzes
the legislative history of I.R.C. § 411,2 the provision governing partial
terminations. Case law, Treasury Regulations, and revenue rulings all
provide examples of situations in which the courts and the Service have
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For the purposes of this article, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, will be
referred to as "Code" and the Employee Retirement income Security Act of 1974, as amended,
will be referred to as "ERISA."
All statutory sections cited herein will be those of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, unless otherwise indicated.
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made determinations concerning whether a partial termination has oc-
curred. Accordingly, these relevant materials are also analyzed.
The governing provisions of the Code and Treasury Regulations
provide for a "facts and circumstances" test; however, no clear authori-
tative guidance for making such a determination has been issued.
Therefore, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of the manner
in which the courts and the Service have handled the issue. While this
article does not recommend a bright line test, its purpose is to pinpoint
the issues and to provide insight for practitioners who need to predict
whether the courts and the Service will find that a partial termination
has, in fact, occurred.
I. PARTIAL TERMINATIONS OF SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLANS PRIOR TO
THE ENACTMENT OF ERISA
Prior to September 2, 1974,1 an employer had the sole authority to
terminate a single-employer defined benefit pension plan.4 Terminations
occurred for a variety of reasons. The most prevalent plan terminations
were prompted by the severe economic hardship placed on the em-
ployer in maintaining the plan. Even if the law had obligated employers
to provide promised pension benefits, employers often could not do so
because of the financial constraints. Plans were fully funded only in
rare circumstances. Neither the courts nor the IRS required employers
to fully fund the plans. 5 Further, after employers declared a termina-
3 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter ERISA] was enacted
on this date. As enacted, the Bill, H.R. 2, became Pub. L. No. 93-406 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R., 26 U.S.C., 26 C.F.R., and 29 C.F.R.).
I ERISA defines a "single-employer defined benefit plan" as "any defined benefit plan ...
which is not a multiemployer plan." ERISA § 4001(a)(15) (1993). A "multiemployer plan" is a
plan
(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute, (ii) which is maintained
pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more em-
ployee organizations and more than one employer, and (iii) which satisfies such other
requirements as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by regulation.
Id. § 4001(a)(3) (1993).
' The legislative history of ERISA illustrates congressional concern with providing "statutory
protections for workers' pension programs." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 1598 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY] (remarks of Sen. Williams). On this issue, Senator Williams specifically cited numerous
examples of individuals who had believed their pensions were secure only to find later that "their
pension expectations ... [were] illusory ... [in that] the employer may shut down, and if there..
. [were] insufficient funds to meet the vested claims of the participants, they have no recourse."
Id. at 1599.
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tion, there was no statutory requirement that employers continue fund-
ing their plans. If the plan was not fully funded, plan participants and
beneficiaries had little recourse against the employer. In addition, be-
cause the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [hereinafter PBGC] 6
had not yet been established, plan participants had no assurance that
they, or their beneficiaries, would ever receive benefits that had
accrued.
ERISA was enacted to combat public concern relative to the
weaknesses of the private pension system.' To quell public worry, Con-
gress created an insurance system to protect the pension benefits prom-
ised to employees. This system of insurance is governed by the PBGC. 8
The PBGC guarantees that employees will receive promised pension
plan benefits even if their employers are in severe financial distress and
are unable to pay such benefits in their entirety.'
The PBGC acts as an insurer for two different types of pro-
grams-single-employer programs and multiemployer programs. The
single-employer program insures the benefits of plans that are spon-
sored by a single employer or a group of employers."0 The multiem-
ployer program, on the other hand, insures collectively bargained plans
and those plans which are sponsored by one or more labor
organizations.1"
' See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. The PBGC has as its mission to "encourage the
growth of private pension plans, pay timely and uninterrupted pension benefits, and maintain pen-
sion insurance premiums at the lowest level necessary to carry out legal obligations." PBGC, 1992
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1993).
7 Senator Dominici, a Republican Senator from New Mexico, summarized the need for legis-
lation as follows: "The simple fact is that at the present time, there is no law which guarantees
that the pension promised in past years, for which workers have devoted a lifetime of loyal service,
will be paid." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1831 (remarks of Sen. Dominici).
6 The PBGC is analogous to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [hereinafter FDIC]
or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation [hereinafter SIPC]. Just as the FDIC and SIPC
protect the investments of depositors in commercial banks and investors of securities respectively,
the PBGC protects the pension benefits of plan participants. PBCG, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 4
(1993).
* PBGC, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1992). The PBGC protects the pension benefits of
slightly more than 32 million participants in about 67,000 single-employer pension plans. PBGC,
1992 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1993). The PBGC also insures approximately 8.9 million participants in
about 2,100 multiemployer plans. Id. at 6.
10 ERISA § 4022 (1993).
" Id. § 4022A.
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PARTIAL TERMINATIONS
When Congress enacted Code section 401, it had not yet contem-
plated the concept of partial termination. The legislative history of
I.R.C. § 401(a)(7)" evidences this omission. Specifically, the legisla-
tive history states that "the bill precludes the possibility that contribu-
tions for employees which have been deducted for income-tax purposes
may revert back to the employer, or owner-employee. This requirement
should serve to prevent abuses resulting from termination of plans.""
The pre-ERISA provisions had the effect of limiting discrimina-
tion in the event of an early plan termination by ensuring full vesting of
benefits if either the plan was terminated or the employer ceased mak-
ing contributions."' Congress, however, failed to consider how benefits
would be provided if there were insufficient funds upon termination.
The first reference in the Code to the term "partial termination"
appeared in section 411(d)(3), which was enacted in 1974.'1 The legis-
lative history of section 411 (d)(3) stated that "the rule of full and im-
mediate vesting is still to apply in the case of a termination, or partial
termination of a plan." 6 However, neither ERISA, the Code, nor their
accompanying legislative histories provided much guidance as to the
definition of partial termination. Instead, practitioners had only the
scant introduction of the concept of partial termination outlined in
Treasury Regulation section 1.401-6(b)(2), enacted in 1963.
Treasury Regulation section 1.401-6 states that in order for a
plan 17 to satisfy the requirements of section 401 of the Code, the plan
must expressly provide that, upon the termination of the plan or upon the
complete discontinuance of contributions under the plan, the rights of each
12 I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) requires that a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus trust be
part of a plan that expressly provides that upon termination, the rights of each employee must
become nonforfeitable to the extent of each employees' accrued benefits in the plan. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(7) (1963).
13 H.R. REP. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 261, 269.
" In requiring full vesting upon partial termination of a plan, Congress attempted to prevent
any forfeited benefits from inuring to the sponsoring employer upon the substantial reduction of
the work force. See United Steelworkers v. Harris & Sons Steel Co., 706 F.2d 1289, 1298 (3d
Cir. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) (1977).
" I.R.C. § 411(d)(3)(1974) is the codification, as amended, of ERISA § 401(a)(7).
16 H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 935 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5058 (emphasis added).
" Under this Regulation, the term "plan" refers to a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus
trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a)(1) (1963).
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employee to benefits accrued to the date of such termination or discontinu-
ance, to the extent then funded, or the rights of each employee to the amounts
credited to his account at such time, are nonforfeitable.' 8
Subsection (b) of section 1.401-6, while attempting to define "partial
termination," provides little guidance. Subsection (b) states that
whether a partial termination of a qualified plan has occurred depends
upon the basis of "all the facts and circumstances."' 19 The subsection
contains examples of both partial terminations and events which do not
rise to the level of partial terminations; however, these examples pro-
vide little instruction. For example, subsection (b) states that "a plan is
terminated when, in connection with the winding up of the employer's
trade or business, the employer begins to discharge his employees."20
The example does not indicate, however, how many employees must be
discharged before a partial or complete termination will occur. Further,
it provides no guidance as to how to distinguish between a partial and a
complete termination.
Section 1.401-6(b)(1) also provides that "a plan is not terminated
... merely because an employer consolidates or replaces [a] plan with
a comparable plan" nor is a plan terminated "merely because an em-
ployer sells or otherwise disposes of his trade or business if the acquir-
ing employer continues the plan as a separate and distinct plan of its
own, or consolidates or replaces that plan with a comparable plan."',
Therefore, while providing a few examples of items that would not con-
stitute a plan termination, the Regulation provides little insight into
which transactions actually would constitute partial terminations.
One final criticism of the Regulation is that, while the section at-
tempts to identify circumstances under which a partial termination
would occur, the Regulation once again fails to provide clear examples
or numerical data to delineate the "facts and circumstances" standard.
's Id. Benefits are considered non-forfeitable
if on the date of termination of the plan the participant (or beneficiary) has satisfied all
of the conditions required of him or her under the provisions of the plan to establish
entitlement to the benefit, except the submission of a formal application, retirement, or
the completion of a required waiting period, or death in the case of a benefit that re-
turns all or a portion of a participant's accumulated mandatory contributions upon his
or her death.
29 C.F.R. § 2613.6(a) (1992).
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Specifically, section 1.401-6(b)(2) indicates that a partial termination
will occur "when benefits or employer contributions are reduced" or
when "the eligibility or vesting requirements under the plan are made
less liberal."22 However, the Regulation merely reiterates that such a
determination must be made based upon all the facts and circum-
stances and does not indicate what facts and circumstances should be
considered. 23 This lack of guidance allows the Service a considerable
amount of discretion on this issue. The answer to the question of what
transactions qualify as partial terminations is often provided through
ad hoc determinations by the IRS district offices and field agents pri-
marily based upon straight numerical data.
In 1977, the Service issued additional regulations that attempted
to define the term "partial termination." Treasury Regulation section
1.411(d)-2(b) restates the "facts and circumstances" test as the stan-
dard for determining whether a partial termination has occurred.', The
Regulation also provides a special rule25 for determining whether a par-
tial termination has occurred:
[A] partial termination shall be deemed to occur if, as a result of such cessa-
tion or decrease, a potential reversion to the employer, or employers, main-
taining the plan (determined as of the date such cessation or decrease is
adopted) is created or increased. If no such reversion is created or increased,
a partial termination shall be deemed not to occur by reason of such cessation
or decrease. 26
22 Id.
" Id. Subsection (c) of the Regulation also attempts to define "complete termination." Id.
§1.401-6(c). However, both "complete" and "partial" plan terminations are defined only through
the ambiguous use of examples.
2, Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b) (1977).
22 This special rule is sometimes referred to as a horizontal partial termination. See infra
notes 140, 186-209 and accompanying text.
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) (1977). Similarly, the Regulation also lists the factors to
be considered in determining whether a complete termination has occurred. Among those factors
are the following:
(i) Whether the employer may merely be calling an actual discontinuance of contribu-
tions a suspension of such contributions in order to avoid the requirement of full vesting
as in the case of a discontinuance, or for any other reason; (ii) [w]hether contributions
are recurring and substantial; and (iii) [w]hether there is any reasonable probability
that the lack of contributions will continue indefinitely.
Id. § 1.411 (d)-2(d)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) is explained with examples in IRS Docu-
ment 6678. Explanation for Worksheet, Form 6677, Plan Termination Standards, IRS Docu-
ment 6678, (4-81), reprinted in PENS. & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) § 107,402, at B-I 100 (Aug. 18,
1986). See also IRS PLAN TERMINATION HANDBOOK, § 252, 4 CCH INTERNAL REVENUE MAN-
UAL 21,147 (Apr. 20, 1990).
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However, in contrast to section 1.401-6, section 1.411 (d)-2(b) pro-
vides a list of transactions which would likely support a finding by the
Commissioner"' that a partial termination had occurred. The following
are included in that list: "[T]he exclusion, by reason of a plan amend-
ment or severance by the employer, of a group of employees who have
previously been covered by the plan; and plan amendments which ad-
versely affect the rights of employees to vest in benefits under the
plan."2 8
It is unclear, however, whether this list of items is exclusive or
whether other factors may prompt a finding of a partial termination as
well. As is illustrated by the cases described below, other factors have
been considered in making such a determination. Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that even though Treasury Regulation section 1.401-6 was
issued before the enactment of ERISA, the Service has not revoked or
updated section 1.401-6. Therefore, it appears that section 1.401-6
must be read in conjunction with Treasury Regulation section
1.411 (d)-2(b).
III. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RULINGS
As noted above, the term "partial termination" remains an unde-
fined term in both the Code and ERISA. While an employer may at-
tempt to decide whether a certain corporate event causes a partial ter-
mination, the determination ultimately remains a question of law and is
decided by the court.2 9 Treasury Regulations, revenue rulings and the
IRS Plan Termination Handbook provide additional authority address-
ing the question of whether a partial termination has occurred.30 How-
" The term "Commissioner," as used throughout this article, refers to the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service.
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b) (1977).
" See Weil v. Retirement Plan Admin. Comm. of Terson Co., 913 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1990),
vacated in part on reh'g, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Assocs.,
860 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1988); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and afid in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101
(1989); In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Morales v. Pan Am. Life
Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D. La. 1989), affid, 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990). Cf. Kreis v.
Charles 0. Townley & Assocs., 833 F.2d 74, 79 (6th Cir. 1987) (look to employer's motives in
determining whether a partial termination has occurred); Taylor v. Food Giant, Inc. Salaried
Employees Pension Plan, 6 Employce Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (arbitrary and
capricious standard); Beck v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2366 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (arbitrary and capricious standard).
" IRS revenue rulings are usually given deference by the courts. Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F.
Supp. at 1163 n.4. However, the IRS Plan Termination Handbook does not carry such weight. Id.
19941
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ever, while each of these resources provide some insight, none furnishes
an exact definition of "partial termination."
The IRS has provided some limited guidance through several of its
rulings. In the case at issue in Revenue Ruling 72-439,1 an employer
established a qualified profit-sharing plan for the benefit of his employ-
ees.82 Five years after the plan was established, nonsalaried employees
were unionized. 3 Pursuant to the union contract, the employer
amended the plan to reduce nonsalaried employees from participation
in future employer contributions.14 The amendment resulted in the inel-
igibility of 120 of the plan's 170 participants.3 5 The IRS viewed this
70.6 percent reduction in plan participants as a partial termination of
the plan." Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 72-510,37 the IRS viewed a
57.6 percent reduction of plan participants," due to the closing of one
of the employer's divisions, as a partial termination. 9 Further, in Reve-
nue Ruling 73-284, ° the IRS concluded that an 80 percent reduction
of plan participants, resulting from a relocation of the company's busi-
ness, constituted a partial termination.4
Private Letter Ruling 7202186880A 2 is also worthy of mention.
In that ruling, a company closed its metal stamping division," and,
The IRS Plan Termination Handbook takes the position that a partial termination will occur if
there is a 20 percent reduction in participation in the plan in one year followed by a complete
termination in a later year or a more than a 50 percent reduction in participation in one year.
Plan Termination Handbook, supra note 26, at § 252(5). Generally, courts view the Handbook
"as a useful guide to be followed when its meaning is clear and consistent with more persuasive
authority and with the underlying purposes sought to be achieved by the partial termination
rules." Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1163 n.4.





8o Id. While the Service calculates a percentage reduction in plan participants, the authors
submit that the reduction in accrued benefits, a direct result of the reduction in plan participants,
is equally important.
07 Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223. Revenue Ruling 72-510 has been superseded by Rev.
Rul. 81-27, 1981-1 C.B. 228. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
Ninety-five participants out of 165 were eliminated pursuant to the closing. Rev. Rul. 72-
510, 1972-2 C.B. 223.
88 Id. at 224.
40 Rev. Rul. 73-284, 1973-2 C.B. 139.
" Id. at 140. In Revenue Ruling 73-284, only 3 out of 15 employees choose to relocate to the
new business. Id. at 139. Hence, the remaining 12 employees were discharged and their benefits
under the plan were eliminated. Id.
4 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7202186880A (Feb. 18, 1972).
43 Id.
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consequently, 96 out of 166 plan participants were terminated."" The
IRS concluded that this 57.8 percent reduction in plan participants
constituted a partial termination.'"
The aforementioned rulings indicate the Service will find a partial
termination only when a "significant number" or "significant percent-
age'46 of employees are affected by an event such as a plant closing,
sale of a business, or corporate reorganization. However, the Service
has failed to articulate a definition of the term "significant." Thus,
courts as well as practitioners are undirected when attempting to deter-
mine whether percentages or absolute numbers are controlling. In addi-
tion, the Service has failed to provide guidance as to when to apply the
significant percentage test. Further, while the corporate events caused
by the employers in each of the above rulings resulted in a greater than
50 percent reduction in plan participants, the rulings fail to address
that a significant number of employees may be terminated even though
such number may not constitute a "significant percentage" under the
Service's guidelines.'7
IV. CASE LAW
Generally, courts have followed the Service's "significant percent-
age" test in determining whether a plan termination has occurred. An
examination of the relevant case law utilizing the "significant percent-
age" test follows.' 8
44 Id.
48 Id.
40 While the test for determining whether a reduction in the number of plan participants
remains far from clear, it appears that the Service, in articulating both the "significant percent-
age" and "significant number" standards, was attempting to address a situation in which a sub-
stantial decrease in the number of plan participants in any plan year has occurred. IRS PLAN
TERMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 26, Pt. VII, Ch. 7950-51.
4' For an illustration of this deficiency, see text accompanying note 321 infra.
48 For additional information concerning partial terminations of single-employer tax qualified
plans, see A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 358-439 (1991);
MICHAEL j. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 794-99
(1991 & Supp. 1993); ISADORE GOODMAN, PLAN TERMINATIONS UNDER ERISA (1978); WIL-
LIAM M. LIEBER, I LIEBER ON PENSIONS 3-252 to 3-264.15 (1992); Stuart M. Lewis, Partial
Terminations of Qualified Retirement Plans-An Evolving Doctrine, 13 COMP. PLAN. J., Jul.
1985, at 223.
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A. Babb v. Olney Paint Co.
In Babb v. Olney Paint Co.,' 9 the employer, Olney Paint Co., spun
off one of its divisions50 with several of Olney's employees accepting
employment in the spun-off corporation. 1 Concerned about the protec-
tion of their benefits that had accrued with Olney, the employees insti-
tuted an action to determine their interests in the pension and profit
sharing plans.52 The United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina entered a judgment in favor of Olney and found that
neither a partial nor complete termination of the plan had taken
place.5 8 Accordingly, the district court held that the employees were
not entitled to full vesting of their benefits under the plan after leaving
their employer.5" The employees appealed the judgment to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 5
The Fourth Circuit applied Revenue Ruling 81-27,5" in which the
IRS held that a partial termination is deemed to occur when a "signifi-
cant percentage" of plan participants are excluded from coverage. 5
The court commented that exact numerical percentages do not deter-
mine the meaning of the term "significant."" Instead, the court applied
a facts and circumstances test.5
4" 764 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1985).
8 Id. at 241.
51 Id.
51 Id.
8a Id. at 243.
a4 Id.
" Id. at 240.
" Rev. Rul. 81-27, 1981-1 C.B. 228. In Revenue Ruling 81-27, 95 out of 165 employees
were excluded from the plan. Id.
'7 Babb, 764 F.2d at 242. See Rev. Rul. 81-27, 1981-1 C.B. 228.
" Babb, 764 F.2d at 242.
5, Id. The court cited the Regulations:
Whether or not a partial termination of a qualified plan occurs (and the time of such
event) shall be determined by the Commissioner with regard to all the facts and cir-
cumstances in a particular case. Such facts and circumstances include: [T]he exclusion
by reason of a plan amendment or severance by the employer, of a group of employees
who have previously been covered by the plan; and plan amendments which adversely
affect the rights of employees to vest in benefits under the plan.
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(l) (1977). Cf. Weil v. Retirement Plan Admin. Comm. for Terson
Co., 750 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5802
(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988).
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Adhering to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ° the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the finding of the district judge that a 12.84 percent
reduction in employees covered by the plan did not constitute a "signifi-
cant" reduction. 61 Further, the court reiterated the rationale of the dis-
trict judge that Olney's decision to cease making further contributions
to the profit sharing plan was temporary and merely the result of unfa-
vorable economic and business conditions.62 The district judge also
found relevant that Olney added new participants to the profit sharing
plan following the first year in which no contributions were made.68
The Fourth Circuit concluded that these factors, taken as a whole,
served to mitigate against the employees' allegation that Olney in-
tended to discontinue future contributions indefinitely.", Hence, finding
no partial termination, the Fourth Circuit held that the employees were
not entitled to the full vesting of their benefits under ERISA even
though the paint division employees were not given either the option of
remaining with Olney or accepting employment in the new
corporation.6 5
B. Weil I
In Weil v. Retirement Plan Administrative Committee for Terson
Co. [hereinafter Weil I]," former employees of the Terson Company,
Inc. [hereinafter Terson] ,6  who were also participants in the Retire-
ment Plan for Salaried Employees of Ward Foods, Inc. [hereinafter
Ward], instituted an action claiming entitlement to certain benefits
from the plan resulting from an alleged partial termination.68 The
60 Rule 52(a) provides in pertinent part that "findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ.
P. 52(a).





750 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5802
(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988).
' Terson's predecessor company was Ward Foods, Inc.
" Weil 1, 750 F.2d at 11. The alleged partial termination resulted from a corporate reorgani-
zation in which Terson purchased Ward and relocated a substantial portion of Ward's operations.
Id. Pursuant to the corporate reorganization, Weil and another employee were terminated. Id.
1994]
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
entered judgment in favor of the employer and the employees appealed.
Under the plan's structure, Ward's employees were required to
contribute a specified portion of their pay to the plan's fund in order to
participate.69 The plan specifically stated that "absent termination or
partial termination of the [p]lan, benefits funded by Ward would vest
only after an employee had completed ten years of service. '70 Since
Weil and the other employee who was terminated had less than ten
years of service at the time of termination, Ward asserted that neither
employee was entitled to any non-vested benefits.7
The district court first examined the effect of the corporate reor-
ganization.72 Because the reorganization forced the closing of all of
Ward's New York operations, the reorganization resulted in a termina-
tion of 104, or 27 percent, of the plan's 386 active participants nation-
wide. 73 In the state of New York, the effect of the reorganization was
more drastic. Fifty-one, or approximately 62 percent, of 83 New York
participants were terminated. 74 Nonetheless, the district court found
that a partial termination had not occurred because the nationwide ter-
mination rate in this case, 27 percent, was lower than those rates in the
revenue rulings upon which the court relied. 75 The terminated employ-
ees appealed.76
The Second Circuit, in reconsidering the partial termination issue,
also looked to the published revenue rulings for guidance. The court
noted that these revenue rulings make clear that "the dismissal of a
'significant number of employees' in connection with a major corporate
event constitutes a partial termination. 17 7 Citing a number of prece-
dents, 8 the court accorded this interpretation "great weight. '7 9 The






"' Id. at 11-12. Weil and the other appellant were both employees of one of the New York
companies. Id.
71 Id. at 12. Specifically, the court examined the following Revenue Rulings: Rev. Rul. 73-
284, 1973-2 C.B. 139 (80 percent termination rate); Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223 (57.6
percent termination rate); Rev. Rul. 72-439, 1972-2 C.B. 223 (70.6 percent termination rate).
Weil 1, 750 F.2d at 12.
76 Well 1, 750 F.2d at 12.
I7 d. (citing Rev. Rul. 73-284, 1973-2 C.B. 137; Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223).
7' See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); see also Federal
Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); H.R. REP.
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occurred on these facts.80 However, holding that the district court's rec-
ord was insufficient for making such a determination," l the Second Cir-
cuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case
for further proceedings.8 1
C. Later Weil Proceedings
On remand, the district court held that a partial termination of the
plan had occurred.8, The court adhered to the advice of the court of
appeals and adopted the Service's position that the "dismissal of a 'sig-
nificant number of employees' in connection with a major corporate
event constitutes a partial termination.18 4 The district court had little
trouble concluding that the relocation and closing of several divisions
after a leveraged buyout constituted a major corporate event.88 Thus,
the only question remaining was whether a "significant number" of
plan participants were terminated.86
In making the "significant number" determination, the court
looked to the Plan Termination Standards published by the Treasury
Department.8 7 The court interpreted those standards to require the in-
clusion of the total number of covered employees that were terminated
in the calculation of the percentage reduction. 8 By including both
vested and non-vested participants, the court calculated a 33.4 percent
reduction of plan participants as a result of the corporate reorganiza-
tion.89 Accordingly, the court held that a partial termination
occurred.90
On further appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that only
terminated partially vested plan participants should be counted in de-
No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. Supp. 236, 300; S. REP. No.
383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. Supp. 80, 129.
79 Weil 1, 750 F.2d 10, 12.
80 Id. at 13.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Weil v. Retirement Plan Admin. Comm. of Terson Co., No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5802, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988), rev'd, 913 F.2d 1045(2d Cir. 1990) and vacated,
in part, on reh'g, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Well II].
8 Id. at *4 (citing Weil 1, 750 F.2d 10, 12).
85 Id. at *7.
16 Id.
87 Id. at *8.
81 Id.
89 Id. at *10. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90 Weil II, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10.
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termining whether a partial termination occurred. 91 The plaintiffs filed
a petition for rehearing. 92 The Second Circuit vacated part of its previ-
ous opinion and concluded that a partial termination had occurred and
that vested as well as non-vested participants must be counted in deter-
mining whether a partial termination occurred. 93
The Second Circuit noted that the legislative intent behind section
411(d)(3) is "far from clear."' " However, the court followed the Ser-
vice's position - that all plan participants must be included - because
it viewed the Service's interpretation as a "reasonable construction in
light of the examples provided in the House and Senate Reports. 95
The Second Circuit interpreted these examples to suggest that "Con-
gress regarded a partial termination ... [as] a sudden and dramatic
change in the plan as a whole."9 Utilizing the 33.4 percent figure dis-
cussed above, the court concluded that a partial termination of plan
participants occurred.97
On the other hand, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, in Weil II,98 adhered to the statutory proce-
dure outlined in the Regulations for determining whether a partial ter-
mination had occurred. As many of the other courts that have
9' Weil H, 913 F.2d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part on reh'g, 933 F.2d 106 (2d
Cir. 1991).
92 Weil H, 933 F.2d 106, 107 (2d Cir. 1991). Shortly after the Second Circuit reached a
decision, the IRS sent a letter to plaintiffs' counsel which stated the following:
The Service has always taken the position that all plan participants, whether or not
fully vested, are considered in determining whether there has been a partial termina-
tion. This position is supported by the statute, [R]egulations and legislative history
under I.R.C. § 411(d)(3). Therefore, the field office's June 22, 1981, determination
letter cited by the [c]ourt in Weil [1] was incorrect to the extent it inferred that only
vested participants are taken into account.
Letter from Martin Slate, Director, IRS Employee Plans Technical and Actuarial Division, to
Sidney Eagle, Esq. (Oct. 17, 1990), reprinted in 17 PENS. REP. (BNA) 1859 (Oct. 29, 1990).
93 Weil H, 933 F.2d at 110.
9" Id. at 109 (citing Vornado, Inc. v. Trustees of Retail Store Employees' Union Local 1262,
829 F.2d 416, 418 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he purpose underlying [section] 411 (d)(3) is not alto-
gether obvious .. "); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 151 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 489 U.S.
101 (1989) ("[Ilt is not easy to divine the purpose of [section] 41 l(d)(3). Without a clear sense of
the provision's purpose it is difficult to decide what should and should not constitute a partial
termination. Clarification from Congress or the Internal Revenue Service as to the purpose of this
provision would make it substantially easier to enforce.").
08 Weil 11, 933 F.2d at 110. The examples cited by the court were the following: "[A] large
reduction in the work force, or a sizeable reduction in benefits under the plan." Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
" See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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addressed the partial termination issue have done, the district court
looked to the pertinent revenue rulings for guidance. However, the
court did not automatically assume that because the percentage reduc-
tion was below the 50 percent threshold announced in the three prece-
dential revenue rulings noted above9" that a partial termination had not
occurred. Instead, the court properly noted ERISA's remedial purpose
of protecting pension plan benefits.' This was the only court at that
time which examined the effect that the partial termination determina-
tion would have on plan participants. The court did not solely look to
the effect on the company as many courts have done.101 Rather, the
district court, after much hedging, calculated the percentage reduction
exclusively for the New York division and not for the plan participants
nationwide. By doing so, the Weil II court acknowledged that ERISA's
protective purpose is to shield employees and plans and not employers.
Weil IH and its true "facts and circumstances" standard should serve as
a guidepost for decision-making in the future.
D. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
The Third Circuit took a different approach than the Weil I court.
The Third Circuit, in Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,'0 2 con-
cluded that the question of whether a partial termination has occurred
should not turn on the number of employees affected or the amount of
money the employer saved by terminating the affected employees.103
Rather, the Third Circuit, creating its own test, held that a partial ter-
mination could be found only if "so many people have been terminated
that the plan appears to have been created as a mechanism for defer-
ring the recognition of income, and thereby reducing taxes, rather than
as a mechanism for the provision of retirement benefits to
employees."' 0'o
'9 See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
101 See infra note 113.
102 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and afld in part a..
rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
10 Id. at 151.
104 Id.
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E. Ehm v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
In another case involving the "significant percentage" test, Ehm v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 05 the district court held that the discharge of
2.5 percent of thrift plan participants nationwide did not constitute a
partial termination. 106 In Ehm, former employees of Phillips Petroleum
Company instituted an action in federal district court to obtain portions
of thrift plan funds contributed by their employer prior to the refinery's
closing.' 07 At issue in the case was whether the employees had a vested
interest in the employer contributions to the thrift plan fund. 08
The Ehm court, too, referred to the revenue rulings for guid-
ance.10 9 The court noted that there were no cases or revenue rulings in
which a substantial number of employees were excluded from the
plan." 0 However, the court did apply the significant percentage test in
this case and concluded that because only 2.5 percent-415 out of
16,444 -- of the plan participants were terminated, a partial termina-
tion had not occurred.1 2
F. Other "Significant Percentage" Cases
There are numerous other cases applying the significant percent-
age test."' For example, in Taylor v. Food Giant, Inc. v. Salaried Em-
105 583 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Kan. 1984).
106 Id. at 1116.
107 Id. at 1114.
108 Id.
'09 The court recognized that while revenue rulings do not have the same authority as Trea-
sury Regulations, such rulings "have the force of legal precedents unless [they are] unreasonable
or inconsistent with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 1115.
110 At the time the Ehm case was decided, the largest number of employees to have been
excluded from a plan had been 120 out of 170 individuals participating in a plan. Id. See Rev.
Rul. 72-439, 1972-2 C.B. 223.
... Ehm, 583 F. Supp. at 114-15.
illId. at 1115-16.
il See, e.g., Weul 11, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991) (33.4 percent reduction of plan partici-
pants constituted a partial termination); Well II, 913 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part on
reh'g, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991) (discharge of 16.4 percent of non-vested participants was not
sufficiently significant to cause partial termination of plan); Kreis v. Charles 0. Townley & As-
socs., 833 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1987) (15 percent and 13.6 percent involuntary exclusion of plan
participants did not constitute a partial termination); Collignon v. Reporting Servs. Co., 796 F.
Supp. 1136 (C.D. Il1. 1992) (partial termination occurred when 83 percent of employees left em-
ployer due to a sale of employer's operating assets); Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins., 718 F. Supp.
1297 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (closing of employer's division which
resulted in a 15.3 percent reduction in the number of benefits in the plan was not a partial termi-
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ployees Pension Plan," the court held that there was no partial termi-
nation where only 13 percent of the plan's participants were
eliminated. 15 Similarly, in Wishner v. St. Luke's Hospital Center,"6
the court held that terminating 3.7 percent of plan participants failed
to meet the significant percentage test.117 Also, in Beck v. Shaw Indus-
tries, Inc.,1 8 the court held that a discharge of only 6.2 percent of pen-
sion plan participants did not constitute a partial plan termination. 19
G. Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner
It is important to describe one final case that applies the signifi-
cant percentage test because the Tax Court, in deciding the partial ter-
mination issue, reached a somewhat perplexing result. In Tipton &
Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner,20 an employer engaged in the engi-
neering consulting business experienced reductions in its workforce due
to the inherent volatility of the business."' For the years 1971 and
1972, plan participations were reduced by 34 percent and 51 percent,
respectively.122
nation); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986), a ffd in part
and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), and cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and affid
in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (sale of corporate assets resulting in only a 2 percent
elimination of plan participants did not constitute a partial termination); Wishner v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 550 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (3.7 percent reduction of plan participants did not
constitute a partial termination); Lovetri v. Vickers, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1975) (1.4
percent elimination of participants was not a partial termination); Peter M. Borunta, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 670 (1988) (termination of 66 2A percent of work force constituted a partial termination);
IRS Special Rul., 9 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) § 6911 (Sept. 11, 1978) (16.7 percent reduc-
tion in participants does not equal a partial termination).
11 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
" Id. at 1291. In Taylor, the sale of one of the employer's divisions resulted in an overall
decrease in active plan participants from 344 to 306 and in the termination of 44 out of 50 divi-
sion employees. Id.
16 550 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
117 Id. at 1019. In Wishner, 1,529 employees were participating in the pension plan at the
time of the alleged partial termination. Id. As a result of a disassociation of a health care provider
with St. Luke's Hospital, 57 employees were excluded from the plan. Id.
2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2366 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
"' Id. at 2369. In Beck, as a result of the sale of a plant, 100 employees out of a total of
1,599 employees covered by the pension plan at issue were removed from employment and thus
excluded from the plan. Id. at 2367.
120 83 T.C. 154 (1984).
12' Id. at 155.
122 Id. at 156.
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The Tax Court concluded that these reductions in plan participa-
tion constituted a partial termination in each year. 13 In so holding, the
Tax Court broadly interpreted the congressional purpose behind the en-
actment of section 401(a)(7)."' Specifically, in this regard, the Tax
Court stated:
We infer from this a broader ameliorative purpose than simply one of
preventing the reversion of contributions to an owner-employee. We think
that Congress, in enacting section 401(a)(7), sought to protect employees
from forfeiting their retirement benefits upon termination of a plan. This
broader [c]ongressional purpose would be ill-served by holding the presence
or absence of an intent or purpose to deprive employees of benefits determina-
tive of whether a termination had occurred. Where a significant percentage of
plan participants are discharged, the effect is the same regardless of the em-
ployer's intent; unless the discharge is treated as a partial termination, a sig-
nificant percentage of plan participants are compelled to forfeit accrued but
unvested retirement benefits.125
This result is startling because it appears inconsistent both with
prior case law and the revenue rulings noted above. As noted, many
courts that have addressed the partial termination issue have referred
to the revenue rulings for guidance. In each of those rulings in which
the IRS found a partial termination, there were reductions of greater
than 50 percent of plan participants. In Tipton, however, the Tax
Court found a partial termination where only 34 percent of the plan
participants were terminated-a perplexing and seemingly inconsistent
result.
Even though the 34 percent reduction which occurred in 1971 126
was somewhat less than the 50 percent standard set forth by the reve-
nue rulings upon which the court relied, the Tax Court in Tipton &
Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner"' reached an equitable result in find-
ing that a partial termination occurred. However, the problem with
Tipton is that the court relied exclusively on the significant percentage
test and did not adequately examine the surrounding facts and circum-
stances as required by statute.
123 Id. at 160.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 155.
127 83 T.C. 154 (1984).
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Before addressing the more recent decisions in this area, it is im-
portant to make a few additional observations. While most courts that
have addressed the partial termination issue have applied the signifi-
cant percentage test, they have failed to address how the significant
percentage test works concurrently with the significant number test. In-
stead, courts have merely relied upon the significant percentage test
while deemphasizing the significant number test. For example, the Tax
Court, in Tipton, stated: "[Since 34 percent and 51 percent are signifi-
cant,] [w]e need not and do not decide whether a partial termination
would occur where a significant number of participants but not a sig-
nificant percent, are excluded from participation in a plan."12 8 Simi-
larly, in Ehm v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 29 because only 2 percent of
the employees were excluded from the plan, the court concluded that a
partial termination had not occurred under the significant percentage
test.130 Assuming the correctness of the significant percentage test, the
court declined to apply the significant number test. " ' Indeed, no court
has found a partial termination by applying only the significant num-
ber test. 82
V. RECENT APPROACHES IN ANSWERING THE PARTIAL TERMINATION
QUESTION
A. The Service's Approach
The Service, in the IRS Plan Termination Handbook, states that
"a plan which shows a substantial decrease (e.g., 20 percent or more)
in the number of plan participants during a plan year may have exper-
ienced a partial termination."1 " Therefore, under the Service's view,
an employer-initiated reduction of plan participants in excess of 20 per-
cent might be significant if it is coupled with other factors, such as the
closing of a plant or division.184 Both the Service and the courts have
concluded that a reduction of a percentage less than 20 percent, espe-
I Id. at 160 n.5.
129 583 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Kan. 1984).
180 Id. at 1115-16.
1' Id.
131 In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1164 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
208 IRS Plan Termination Handbook, supra note 26, Pt. VII, Ch. 7950-51.
18, Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164. See IRS Plan Termination Handbook, supra
note 26, at § 252(5).
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cially on a company-wide basis, could only be significant if the employ-
ees present evidence of "egregious" factors such as the evasion of pen-
sion obligations or prohibited discrimination in favor of highly
compensated employees. 13 5
The Service also seems to hold the view that other factors, if sig-
nificant, may be indicative of the occurrence of a partial termination
even with a plan participant reduction of something less than 20 per-
cent. 136 Once again, however, the Service has failed to articulate the
events that are "significant" enough to obtain an IRS ruling that a
partial termination has occurred. Further, the Service has failed to
state whether a reduction of a very small percentage of plan partici-
pants coupled with some undefined significant event may be sufficient
to find a partial termination. In addition, it remains unclear whether a
20 percent bright line test is to be applied where, regardless of the
significance of the corporate event, the percentage is so small that no
partial termination could be deemed to have occurred.
B. Commentator's Viewpoint
Prior to 1985 no distictions had been made relative to the different
types of partial terminations. In July of that year, Stuart M. Lewis
published his article, Partial Terminations of Qualified Retirement
Plans-An Evolving Doctrine.187 In that article, Lewis distinguished
between two forms of partial terminations-vertical and horizontal. 188
In Lewis' view, vertical partial terminations are terminations that
are the result of a plant or division closing or employee turnover."3 9 The
revenue rulings and relevant caselaw had previously addressed this type
of partial termination. The second type of partial termination, a hori-
zontal partial termination,' 40 had never been discussed prior to its men-
18' Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164. See Weil 11, 913 F.2d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir.
1990), vacated in part on reh'g, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991); IRS Plan Termination Handbook,
supra note 26, at §§ 252(8), 252(9)(d), 252(10).
186 An employer's bad motive, for example, could provide support to the Service's position
that a partial termination has occurred even if the calculated percentage does not equal 20 percent
or more. Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164 n.7.
187 Lewis, supra note 48.
18 Id. at 224-28.
189 Id. at 224-26.
110 A horizontal partial termination may occur in one of two ways. First, such termination
may be present due to the special rule of Treasury Regulation section 1.411 (d)-2(b)(2). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) (1977). A horizontal partial termination may also occur when the
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tion by Lewis. 41 In 1991, the court in Gulf Pension was the first to
accept Lewis' delineation between the two types of partial terminations.
In re Gulf Pension Litigation" 2 illustrates the continuing struggle for
clarity and represents a modern approach in determining whether a
partial termination of a single-employer plan has occurred.
C. In re Gulf Pension Litigation
Gulf Pension involved a consolidated class action suit brought on
behalf of more than 40,000 former participants in a pension plan main-
tained by Gulf Oil Corporation [hereinafter Gulf]."a Gulf's manage-
ment, attempting to streamline the company, enacted a corporate re-
structuring plan which substantially reduced its number of
employees."" Amid rumors of a hostile tender offer, Gulf merged with
another oil company, Chevron Corporation [hereinafter Chevron]."
The management of both Gulf and Chevron agreed that maintaining
the current workforce of both companies would be redundant." 6 Chev-
ron, therefore, decided to sell parts of Gulf."" Accordingly, some em-
ployees were terminated." 8
Shortly after the terminations, a class action suit was filed on be-
half of the former employees of Gulf.1"9 The plaintiffs claimed that the
plan undergoes a series of amendments which make benefits and eligibility for benefits more re-
strictive than had previously been the case. See Lewis, supra note 48, at 227-28.
.1 Lewis, supra note 48, at 227-28.
14* 764 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
143 Id. at 1160.
14 Id. This plan was prompted by a concern of Gulf management that Gulf's share price did
not reflect its true value. Id.
14. Id. The merger with Chevron was a friendly merger which avoided the hostile takeover




149 Id. It is important to note the individuals certified as a class by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. These individuals were the following:
(1) All participants in the Pension Plan of Gulf Oil Corporation or any predecessor
plan (sometimes abbreviated as the "Gulf Plan" or "Plan") who terminated em-
ployment for any reason after December 31, 1981, and before July 1, 1986, with
Gulf Oil Corporation or its successors or affiliates, or any subsidiaries that had
adopted the Gulf Plan ("Gulf").
(2) All Gulf Plan participants who were accruing benefits under the Gulf Plan as of
June 30, 1986.
(3) All Gulf Plan participants who terminated Gulf employment prior to January 1,
1982, and who were receiving a pension or entitled to an immediate or deferred
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defendants'1 " actions constituted a partial termination of the Gulf Pen-
sion Plan."' The plaintiffs' assertions as well as the court's analysis of
each issue follow. 1 52
1. Vertical vs. Horizontal Partial Terminations
As Lewis articulated, there are two types of partial terminations.
Each label carries great significance and will be discussed in turn in
evaluating the Gulf Pension court's articulation of the rules governing
each type of partial termination.
a. Vertical Partial Termination
As noted above, prior to 1985, the concept of "horizontal partial
termination" had not been introduced. Consequently, the general
rule " ' for determining whether a partial termination had occurred ",
was a facts and circumstances test under the vertical partial termina-
tion rules. In applying the regulatory partial termination standard, the
pension or a refund of accumulated employee contributions under the Gulf Plan as
of June 30, 1986.
(4) All Gulf Plan participants who terminated employment with Gulf prior to January
1, 1982, and after December 31, 1975, who were not entitled to any pension benefit
under the Gulf Plan at the time of such termination (other than a refund of accu-
mulated employee contributions) but who, if they had been reemployed by Gulf as
of June 30, 1986, would have been entitled under the ERISA break-in-service rules
to credit for prior service under the Gulf Plan.
(5) All spouses, joint annuitants, or other plan beneficiaries of any deceased Gulf Plan
participants described in the foregoing categories.
(6) All alternate payees under qualified domestic relations orders of separated or di-
vorced Gulf Plan participants described in the foregoing categories.
Id. at 1160-61.
'0 The defendants were Chevron Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, the Chevron Corpora-
tion Retirement Plan, the Pension Plan of Gulf Oil Corporation, the Benefits Committee of the
Pension Plan of Gulf Oil Corporation and each of its members, and the Pension Committee of the
Pension Plan of Gulf Oil Corporation and each of its members. Id. at 1160.
" Id. at 1161. The plaintiffs raised the following additional issues that are not relevant to
this article and consequently will only be mentioned here. The plaintiffs claimed that two of the
plans constituted "wasting trusts" under common law, that some employees were entitled to early
retirement benefits, that other employees were entitled to benefits under the company's severance
plan, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty
pursuant to the corporate merger. Id.
"I For easier readability, the court's analysis is divided into two sections - vertical partial
termination and the horizontal partial termination.
1:8 Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(1) (1977).
'" See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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court in, Gulf Pension, utilized the facts and circumstances test. 15 In
applying that test, the court relied upon the three predominant revenue
rulings noted above for guidance. 156
As the cited revenue rulings illustrate, the most commonly applied
tests for determining whether a partial termination has occurred are
the significant number and significant percentage tests. However, these
tests leave certain waters unchartered. The Gulf Pension case is signifi-
cant because it provides answers to some crucial, yet unanswered,
questions.
i. Are Vested Participants Counted?
Gulf Pension provides an answer to the inquiry of whether both
terminated vested and non-vested employees should be considered in
applying the significant number and significant percentage tests.157
However, there is no unanimous authority which provides a solution to
the aforementioned query.
The court, in Gulf Pension, ruled that not all of Gulf's terminees
should be considered for purposes of determining whether a partial ter-
mination occurred. The court held that only non-vested terminees need
be considered.'" The court reasoned that the inclusion of vested
terminees in the determination would not further the policy of prevent-
ing "a windfall to the employer through the reversion of money on
which the employer has paid no federal income tax" because the termi-
nation of vested participants would not generate any forfeitures. 59
In the Weil proceedings, 160 the Second Circuit had initially held
that in determining whether a partial termination has occurred, only
the percentage of non-vested participants should be considered. 61 This
decision was contrary to the long-standing position of the IRS that the
entire work force, including fully vested terminees, should be included
in the significant number and significant percentage calculations. The
Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1163.
184 Rev. Rul. 73-284, 1973-2 C.B. 139; Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 72-
439, 1972-2 C.B. 223.
157 Id. at 1164.
1" Id. at 1165.
1 Id.
180 913 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part on rehg, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991).
1' Id. at 1051.
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Second Circuit later vacated that part of its judgment, and held that
vested as well as non-vested participants should be counted.1 62
For employers trying to determine whether a partial termination
has occurred, this conflict of views between the circuits presents a di-
lemma. The conflict illustrates the fact that employers have no assur-
ance of how the court in a specific district will rule. This difficulty in
prediction is especially acute for employers with percentage reductions
of plan participants either slightly above or below the 20 percent IRS
benchmark.
ii. Are Employees Who Transferred to Successor Plans
Counted?
Gulf Pension was the first decision to answer the question of
whether employees who, as a result of a corporate reorganization or
merger, later became employed with the successor corporation and
whose accrued pension benefits were transferred to a successor plan,
should be counted for the purposes of determining whether a partial
termination has occurred.163 Utilizing the same rationale as the above-
mentioned vested/non-vested approach, which focused on the further-
ance of the policy goals outlined in the legislative history of ERISA,
the court concluded that such employees should not be included in the
calculation.164 Subsequent courts have followed the Gulf Pension deci-
sion on this issue. 168
iii. Turnover Rate
The third issue addressed in Gulf Pension was whether an em-
ployer should be entitled to exclude employee terminations which are
the result of normal turnover.16 6 In making this determination, the pri-
mary relevant factors are the definition of the term "normal" and
whether the party asserting that a partial termination has occurred
bears the burden of proof of establishing the normal turnover rate. 6"
162 Weil II, 933 F.2d at 110.
188 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164.
'6, Id. at 1165-66. This conclusion is consistent with section 1.401-6(b)(1) of the Treasury
Regulations. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
165 See Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216 (1993).
,6 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164.
167 Id.
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Citing Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Associates,68 the Gulf Pen-
sion court stated that only involuntary, employer-initiated terminations
should be considered in calculating whether a significant percentage or
significant number of a workforce has been terminated. 169 In addition,
the court clarified that the burden of establishing the normal turnover
rate is on the employer.17 0 The court did not espouse its reasoning for
placing the burden of establishing the normal turnover rate on the em-
ployer. However, the authors assume that placing the burden on the
employer, first, furthers the policy concerns of protecting employees
against a reduction of benefits at the employer's whim and, second, is
appropriate since the use of the "turnover rate" is a defense to a claim
that a partial termination has occurred.
iv. Time Period of "Significant" Corporate Event
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the significant
percentage and significant number tests should be calculated on an an-
nual basis or whether the tests may apply when a significant corporate
event occurs over a two-and-one-half-year period.' 7' In answering this
inquiry, the court noted that there is no language in the Regulations
requiring that a significant corporate event occur within one year. 7 2
Moreover, the Service17 and the courts'7 4 that have addressed the issue
have held that a series of employer-initiated terminations related to the
same corporate event may be aggregated in determining whether a par-
108 860 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1988).
100 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1166. This is consistent with the approach of the
IRS. In General Counsel Memorandum 39,344, the IRS ruled that no partial termination oc-
curred when the reduction in plan participants is due to employee-initiated action. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,344 (Oct. 16, 1984). In General Counsel Memorandum 39,344, striking employees re-
fused to return to work at the end of the strike. Id. The Chief Counsel's Office of the IRS rea-
soned that section 411 (d)(3) of the Code was not enacted to protect employees from the conse-
quences of a voluntary act. Id.
170 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1167. The court labeled this proposition as being
consistent with recent case law; see Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1302-03
(E.D. La. 1989), affid, 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990). For the IRS' view, see IRS Plan Termination
Handbook, supra note 26, at § 252(7).
171 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1164.
172 Id. at 1167.
171 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Commissioner, No. 29820-88R (Nov. 17, 1988),
the Service issued a technical advice memorandum which found a partial termination due to a
corporate reorganization over the seven year period at issue. Id.
17, See Weil 1, 750 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5802 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988).
1994]
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV.
tial termination has occurred even though the corporate event occurs
over a period of longer than one year.17
v. Calculation of "Significant Number/Percentage"
As noted above, courts generally have not applied the significant
number test in determining whether a partial termination has oc-
curred.17 Instead, most courts have applied the significant percentage
test. However, the court, in Gulf Pension, clarified the meaning of the
term "significant number." According to the court, a significant num-
ber equals the total number of plan members terminated, less the
following:
(i) those individuals who were already vested under the plan;
(ii) those individuals who voluntarily retired; 177
(iii) those individuals who transferred to successor plans; and
(iv) those individuals who died' 7 8
To calculate the percentage decrease in plan participants, the
court divided the significant number obtained from the formula above
by the sum of the non-vested plan participants at the start of the period
and the non-vested participants added throughout the period. 179 Apply-
ing that formula, the court found a 45.2 percent decrease in plan par-
M Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1167. This holding is in accord with the view of the
IRS and the Second Circuit. Id. at 1167-68.
176 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
177 The court noted that this number includes both discounted and undiscounted early retir-
ees and disability retirees. Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1168.
176 Id. Applying this formula, the court determined that in 1984, there were 1,825 total rele-
vant reductions, i.e., 2,623 terminations less the following: 263 (vested terminees), 483 (retire-
ments), and 52 (deaths). Id. Similarly, in 1985, there were 6,588 terminations, less 1,372 (vested
terminees), 531 (retirements), 967 (transfers to successor plans), and 39 (deaths), for a total of
3,679 relevant terminations. Id. Finally, from January to June, 1986, there were 1,843 termina-
tions, less 472 (vested terminees), 187 (retirements), 245 (transfers to successor plans), and 16
(deaths), for a total of 923 relevant terminations. Id.
176 Id. Applying that rationale, in 1984, the court found a percentage decrease of 13.3 per-
cent by dividing the significant number, 1,825, by the total of 13,772 non-vested members [12,688
(previous calculation) plus 1,084 (new members)]. Id. Similarly, for 1985, the court found a per-
centage decrease of 32.4 percent by dividing the significant number of 3,679 by the total of 11,365
non-vested members [11,034 (previous calculation) plus 331 (new members added)]. Id. Finally,
for the months January through June of 1986, the court found a percentage decrease of 12.1
percent by dividing the significant number, 923, by the total of 7,650 non-vested members [7,520
(previous calculation) plus 130 (new members)]. Id. It is important to note that this calculation is
in accord with the Service's view. IRS Plan Termination Handbook, supra note 26, at § 252(7).
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ticipants over the two-and-one-half year period. 8 The court held that
this 42.5 percent decrease and the 6,427 employer-initiated termina-
tions satisfied both the significant percentage and significant number
tests.181
vi. Facts and Circumstances Test
Applying the facts and circumstances test as required by stat-
ute,1812 the Gulf Pension court determined that the reductions in plan
participants were the result of corporate planning by the defendants to
reduce the benefits available to Gulf employees who remained with
Chevron. 83 The court also concluded that there was an increased po-
tential for reversion of plan assets on behalf of Gulf because the termi-
nations occurred pursuant to a plan under which Chevron was attempt-
ing to revert surplus Gulf Plan assets for its general corporate use.1'
Based on all of the facts and circumstances outlined above, the court
held that a vertical partial termination had occurred. 185
b. Horizontal Partial Termination
The revenue rulings and court decisions that have addressed the
partial termination issue have primarily focused upon whether a verti-
cal partial termination has occurred. Very little authority exists which
details when horizontal reductions constitute partial terminations.
A horizontal partial termination may occur under two situations.
The first situation involves the special rule in Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.411 (d)-2(b)(2) regarding a reduction of employee benefits which
subsequently causes a reversion of plan assets to the employer.186 Sec-
ondly, a horizontal partial termination may be deemed to occur where
the adopted plan amendments make eligibility and vesting provisions
more restrictive than they had been previously under the plan.1 87
180 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1168.
'~' Id. at 1170.
1" A facts and circumstance analysis is required because the significant percentage alone is
not sufficient to establish a partial termination. In addition to a significant reduction in plan par-




'" Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (d)-2(b)(2) (1977). See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
17 See Lewis, supra note 48, at 227-28.
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The situation alluded to in the Regulations ' " is comprised of two
elements. First, there must be a cessation or decrease in future benefit
accruals in a defined benefit plan.189 Second, that cessation or decrease
must create a potential reversion to the employer;1 90 the rule does not
require that an employer actually attempt to achieve a reversion.1 91 A
mere potential for reversion due to a cessation or decrease of future
benefit accruals is sufficient for a finding of a horizontal partial
termination.1 92
In Gulf Pension, the plaintiffs argued that they had suffered a de-
crease in future benefit accruals because the Gulf Plan merged with the
Chevron Plan. 19 3 The defendants, on the other hand, argued that sec-
tion 411 "protects only accrued benefits."" 4 Essentially, the defendants
asserted that the scope of the horizontal partial termination rule must
be limited to the protection of future accruals of accrued benefits . 96
The court, unpersuaded by the defendants' argument, 96 held that an-
cillary benefits197 should be included in making the determination of
whether a horizontal partial termination occurred. 99
The court reasoned that the horizontal partial termination rule
was intended to deter employers from adopting plan amendments that
lessen accruals of future benefits if the result of such an amendment
would be to create or increase the likelihood that the employer could
receive a reversion of plan assets in the future.' 99 The court further
188 Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) (1977).
188 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1172.
190 Id.
11 Id. When faced with the argument that a partial termination has occurred because of a
cessation or reduction in participation, employers have argued that the cessation or reduction was
caused by adverse economic conditions rather than an intent to create or increase a reversion. The
IRS, in Revenue Ruling 81-27, held that intent will not negate the Service's finding that a partial
termination has occurred. See Tipton & Kalmbach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 154 (1984);
Rev. Rul. 81-27, 1981-1 C.B. 228.
18 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1172.
193 Id.
'" Id. at 1176 (quoting Defendants' Post-Trial Brief Regarding Horizontal and Vertical Par-
tial Terminations, at 3).
195 Id.
18" Id.
"I Gulf Pension involved a claim for disability benefits. Id. at 1175.
198 Id.
1"I Id. at 1177. Notably, Congress has provided several pieces of evidence of its intent to
prevent a corporate windfall. Congress, through the enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1990, imposed an excise tax of 20 percent for any assets that revert back to the employer
pursuant to a termination of an employee pension plan. Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 12001-02, 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-562 to 1388-566 (Nov. 5, 1990) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980(a), (d)).
Additionally, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 also imposed a 50 percent excise tax on the
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opined that the horizontal partial termination rule was enacted to pre-
vent an employer from amending a plan to eliminate or at least reduce
future benefits promised by a plan. 200 The court noted that this is a
broader goal than that of section 411, the anti-cutback rules, which
protect already accrued benefits.20 1 Citing Treasury Regulation section
1.411 (d)-2(b)(2), °2 the court held that a horizontal partial termination
had occurred as a result of the merger of the Gulf Plan into the Chev-
ron Plan on July 1, 1986 since four early retirement and other retire-
ment-type subsidies were eliminated prospectively beginning on Janu-
ary 1, 1986.20 This elimination, the court concluded, resulted in a
decrease in the present value of liabilities to former Gulf Plan partici-
pants ranging from $83 to $102 million, thereby causing the
overfunded status 20 of the merged plan. 215 It is important to recall the
effect on plan participants of a court's declaration that a partial termi-
nation has occurred. A partial termination is only significant for vesting
purposes; such a declaration has no effect on whether the plan is termi-
nated.200  However, in Gulf Pension, the court went a step beyond
merely interpreting the statute and accompanying Regulations and
granted an equitable remedy by concluding that the overfunded plan
should have been terminated when the participants ceased to accrue
additional benefits.207 Most practitioners, as well as these authors, be-
lieve that the court's holding exceeds the bounds of judicial activism.2 08
The statute clearly provides that the remedy for a partial termination is
the full vesting of accrued benefits, not the termination of the plan.2 0 9
amount of asset reversion to the employer unless the employer transfers part of the reversion to a
replacement plan or provides more favorable benefits. Id.
2" Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1177.
201 Id.
'0, Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2) (1977).
ZoO Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1173.
', A plan is said to be "overfunded" when the employer's accumulated contributions exceed
the minimum required contribution under law. See STEVEN G. VERNON, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS:
VALUATION, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES 324 (1993).
205 Id.
'0' See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b) (1963).
207 Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
"0" See infra notes 339-42 and accompanying text.
s- I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (1993).
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D. Gluck v. Unisys Corp.
Since Gulf Pension utilized the concept of horizontal partial termi-
nations, recent courts have begun to test for horizontal partial termina-
tions in addition to vertical partial terminations. For example, in 1992,
the Third Circuit rejected the notion that a partial termination could
only occur vertically in Gluck v. Unisys Corp.210
In Gluck, employees brought an action seeking damages for
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the partial termination of
their pension plan.2" The alleged partial termination arose out of a
merger between Burroughs Corporation and Unisys Corporation.212
Subsequent to the merger, the Burroughs Pension Plan was merged
into the Unisys Pension Plan.2 13 Because the Unisys Pension Plan es-
tablished a uniform retirement benefit system for its covered employ-
ees, both contributory and non-contributory former Burroughs partici-
pants were placed on equal footing.214 In addition, the Unisys Pension
Plan suffered a reduction in the early retirement benefit formula, spe-
cifically eliminating the early retirement benefit for those with thirty or
more years of service.218
The employees filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging a partial termi-
nation and various breaches of fiduciary duty arising from that partial
termination. 6 The district court barred the plaintiffs' fiduciary claims
as untimely and dismissed the nonfiduciary claims, holding that no par-
tial termination had occurred.21 7 The employees appealed.218
In discussing the partial termination issue, the Third Circuit reit-
erated the standard utilized by past courts in making the determination
that a partial termination has occurred. Because courts have tradition-
ally focused on the vertical partial termination issue, those standards
involved testing for a reduction in plan participants by utilizing either
the significant number or significant percentage tests.219 The Gluck
3-0 960 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1992).
21, Id. at 1175.
212 Id. at 1174-75.
213 Id.
I" Id. at 1175.
215 Id.
I" ld. Only the partial termination issue will be addressed in this article.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1183.
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court noted that the Third Circuit had rejected the significant number
and significant percentage approaches in the past "and insisted on a
relation between the number of employees terminated and the appear-
ance of the plan as a mechanism for deferring income, not paying
benefits."22
While focusing on the tax aspects of ERISA, the Gluck court ad-
hered to the facts and circumstances test and the special rule governing
horizontal partial terminations outlined in the Regulations.2 The
court followed the horizontal partial termination rule in Gulf Pension
because it believed that the rule "highlights the kind of employer activ-
ity that ERISA seeks to redress [-] manipulation of a tax-qualified
trust to an employer's advantage in a way that frustrates employee ex-
pectations." 2 ' The court noted that the vesting requirement of section
411(d)(3) only protects employee benefits to the extent they have ac-
crued.223 However, it does not prohibit all employer manipulations of
future benefits.22" With those precautions in mind, the Third Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to
whether the special rule in the Regulations was satisfied in this case. 225
220 Id. (citing Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 151 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and a f'd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)). The Gluck
court explained its rejection of the vertical partial termination test in the following manner:
We did not limit partial terminations to vertical partial terminations. Indeed, we had
previously recognized the possibility that "a mere reduction in benefits can, in some
circumstances, constitute a 'partial termination.' " Id. (citing Harris & Sons Steel Co.,
706 F.2d 1289, 1299 n.24 (3d Cir. 1983)). We did not, in Bruch, expressly reject a
"facts and circumstances" based approach to partial terminations. Rather, we rejected
the . . . [Service]'s "significant percentage" test, disagreed with the approach of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in following it, and redirected the inquiry into
the event claimed to have constituted a partial termination. We refocused the inquiry
on the tax aspect of ERISA, and we invited Congress or the IRS to elaborate, Bruch,
828 F.2d at 151, an invitation which has gone unanswered.
Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1183-84.




I2 Id. at 1185.
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E. Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner
The most recent case to address the partial termination issue as of
the writing of this article is Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner.226 This
Tax Court decision demonstrates that courts are becoming more sensi-
tive to the partial termination issue and the need to consider all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances before making a decision that a
partial termination has occurred. Halliburton Corporation227  estab-
lished a defined contribution profit sharing plan for its employees in
1944.221 The plan was amended several times after its establishment
through 1985, but the plan continued to receive favorable determina-
tion letters from the IRS during that time.22 While it had made an-
nual contributions to the plan in every year prior to 1986, Halliburton
made no contributions in 1986 because no profits were earned during
that year.2 30
During April 1987, Halliburton submitted an application to the
IRS for affirmation that the plan remained tax qualified under section
401(a).2a1 In September of that same year, the IRS issued a proposed
adverse determination letter which stated that the Halliburton Plan
had experienced a partial termination in 1986 as a result of a large
workforce decline. 32 After numerous administrative conferences, Halli-
burton filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a review of the
Commissioner's proposed adverse determination. 83
26 100 T.C. 216 (1993). Shortly before the publication of this article, the Fifth Circuit, in a
summary decision, affirmed the findings of the Tax Court. Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 73
AFTR 2d 11 94-1006 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).
127 "Halliburton . . . [Company] is one of the world's largest and most diversified oil field
services and engineering and construction organizations. Halliburton's business is divided into
three principal categories: Oil field services and products; industrial engineering and construction
services; and marine engineering and construction services." Id. at 216-17.
28 Id. at 217.
19 Id. During the period 1944 until 1985, Halliburton contributed approximately 10 percent
of annual profits to the plan, which totalled $575 million. Id. During that time, the plan paid out
approximately $600 million in benefits. Id.
110 Id.
211 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1993).
,1 Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216, 218 (1993). The determination letter
concluded that the plan no longer qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a) because I.R.C. § 41 1(d)(3)
requires that upon occurrence of a partial termination the former participants must be fully vested
and at that time they were not. Id.
23 Id. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies. This motion was denied. Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 98
T.C. 88 (1992). The Commissioner subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for failure to notify all
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The court ultimately accepted defendant's argument that the al-
leged partial termination arose because Halliburton experienced finan-
cial difficulties during 1986 when a sharp decline in the oil industry
occurred.23 Faced with this financial crisis, Halliburton adopted a
broad array of cost-cutting measures.2"5 One of those measures in-
volved reducing the age at which an employee became eligible for early
retirement.213 In order to further reduce costs, Halliburton also imple-
mented a wage freeze, a furlough program, and involuntary layoffs
during 1986.237
On January 1, 1986, the plan had a total of 19,017 participants. 3 8
At the end of 1986, there were 19,598 participants. 239 Also relevant is
the fact that during 1986, Halliburton combined its IMCO Services
Division with a division of Dresser Industries to form a joint venture
affected parties. This second motion was also denied. Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
1992-534.
', Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216, 219 (1993). Almost three-quarters of
Halliburton's revenues come from services performed for the petroleum industry. Id. Due to over-
production in the Middle East, the oil industry began to collapse in 1985. Id. During the period
beginning December, 1985, to August, 1986, the price of oil plummeted from $27 per barrel to
$10 per barrel and production of oil in the United States dropped to its lowest level since 1977. Id.
As a result, oil exploration and production dropped drastically with the steepest decline occurring
during the first seven months of 1986. Id.
... Id. at 220. Included among those cost-cutting measures was a slash in the annual budget
as well a cut in the dividend rate of 44 percent. Id.
"' Id. The early retirement age was reduced from age 55 to age 50. Id. The letter addressed
to employees announcing this early retirement option stated the following:
This temporary change in the retirement policy is being made due to our existing work
load and business forecasts for the immediate future .... It is for the purpose of en-
couraging early retirements at this time in our attempts to reduce our workforce in line
with our business. While we had hoped that normal attrition would accomplish our
objectives, additional reductions may be necessary. For those of you who have been
contemplating early retirement, we urge your serious consideration during this period
which might possibly save the job of another employee.
Id.
As noted above, the early retirement option was purely voluntary; employees age 50 and older
were not forced into early retirement. Id.
237 Id. at 220-21.
238 Id. at 221.
2*1 Id. at 223. A summary of the changes in plan participation follows:
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named M-I Drilling Fluids Co. [hereinafter M-I].240 As a result of the
joint venture, 437 participants transferred to the M-I plan. 41
1. Application of the Vertical Partial Termination Rules
Because this case involved the elimination of employees who were
covered under an employer-sponsored plan, the Tax Court applied the
vertical partial termination rules in analyzing whether a partial termi-
nation occurred . 42 The court first noted the legislative concern the par-
tial termination rules were designed to prevent-a reduction in plan
participation resulting from abuse, bad faith, or misconduct by the em-
ployer.2 " The court concluded that no bad faith was present in this
case because Halliburton did not gain anything by reducing plan par-
ticipation and no reversion of plan assets occurred.
Halliburton argued that once the determination was made that no
bad faith was present, the facts and circumstances inquiry should
end.2 45 The court disagreed, noting that "[w]hile .. .one purpose of
the [partial termination] rule is to prevent abuse, the rule has the addi-





Terminations for Cause 264
Transferee






Zero Balance Accounts 231
Total Decrease in Participation in 1986 7,720
Participants at Beginning of 1986 19,017
Participants Added in 1986 581
TOTAL 19,598
140 Id. at 221.
241 Id. at 222.
242 Id. at 225-26 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(1) (1977)).
143 Id. at 226.
24 Id. The court concluded that Halliburton's actions were the result of "emergency mea-
sures" necessary to protect itself from going out of business. Id. at 227.
245 Id.
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fits." '246 The court further stated that "[t]he partial termination rule
does not serve exclusively as a sanction for employer abuse, but also
serves to protect employees who would otherwise be left out in the cold
after a drastic and sudden change in the plan. 247
Halliburton then argued that the partial termination rules were
not designed to apply to periodic layoffs that occur in cyclical indus-
tries.24 While recognizing that the argument asserted by Halliburton
may have been meritorious in another context, the Tax Court rejected
its applicability to the facts of this case. 4 9
The Tax Court then discussed the importance of finding a "signifi-
cant corporate event" when applying the partial termination rules,5 0
and noted that the corporate event described in this case was unlike
those at issue in the prior cases and revenue rulings in which partial
terminations had been found." 1 Halliburton did not permanently
restructure its operations like a company which faced a closing of one
of its divisions or plants. 52 Rather, the court found that Halliburton
engaged in a "temporary economizing measure" in order to circumvent
a business emergency.5 3 Halliburton was able to rehire a significant
number of the laid-off employees relatively quickly.254 This, the court
concluded, exemplified the transitory nature of Halliburton's actions.25
Accordingly, the court held that the reduction in plan participants in
I46 ld. (citing Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1992); Amato v.
Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1409 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1113
(1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Harris & Sons Steel Co., 706 F.2d 1289, 1298 (3d Cir.
1983)).
7 Id. at 228 (citing Chait v. Bernstein, 835 F.2d 1017, 1021 (3d Cir. 1987)). As the court
noted: "Petitioner's argument boils down to the simple assertion that it was not at fault. Although
this may be true, neither were the discharges the fault of the discharged employees, who neverthe-
less were compelled to forfeit their retirement benefits." Id. at 229 (citing Tipton & Kalmbach,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 154, 160-61 (1984)). Accordingly, the fact that there was no bad
faith motive present by the employer will not negate a finding by the court that a partial termina-
tion had occurred. Id.
248 Id. at 230.
24' Id.
250 Id. at 231.
221 Id. Although Halliburton required a major restructuring of its operations similar to a
plant closing or post-merger consolidation, Halliburton's response to its crisis distinguished it from
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this case was less suggestive of a partial termination than in the case of
a permanent restructuring.
25 6
a. The Significant Number Test
The Service, consistent with the historical application of its partial
termination rule, urged the Tax Court to utilize the significant number
test as the exclusive means for determining that a partial termination
had occurred.25 7 The court rejected the Service's test, however, stating
that the significant number test had been announced in a revenue rul-
ing2 58 and was therefore entitled to no special deference.2 59 Because the
court found no legal basis for the significant number test except arbi-
trary decision-making on the part of IRS agents, the court rejected the
Commissioner's assertions that this test should control.2 60
b. The Significant Percentage Test
Recognizing that the significant percentage test has been widely
accepted by courts that have addressed the partial termination issue,
the Tax Court applied the test in this case. 61 However, Halliburton is
significant in that this court, for the first time, explained the possible
rationale behind the significant percentage test.282
First, the court concluded that the legislative history of ERISA
suggests that the relative size of the reduction is important in determin-
25o Id.
257 Id.
,58 On this issue, the court stated: "[A] ruling or other interpretation by the Commissioner is
only as persuasive as her reasoning and the precedents upon which she relies." Id. at 232. It
should be noted here that the significant number test was announced in Revenue Ruling 72-510.
See Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 C.B. 223.
258 Id. (citing Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 215, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 714
(1941); Helvering v. New York Trust, 292 U.S. 455 (1934); Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243,
250-51 (1986)). As the Fifth Circuit stated: "[A revenue] ruling is merely the opinion of a lawyer
in the agency and must be accepted as such. It may be helpful in interpreting a statute, but it is
not binding on the Secretary [of the Treasury] or the courts. It does not have the effect of a
[Riegulation or a Treasury Decision." Id. (citing Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs. v. United States,
445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971)).
"Io Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216, 233-34 (1993).
I01 d. at 234.
'" Until this case, no court or the IRS attempted to provide any clear rationale why the test
had been applied. They simply applied the test arbitrarily.
[Vol. 2:2
SINGLE-EMPLOYER TAX QUALIFIED PLANS
ing that a partial termination has occurred.26 3 Citing Senate Report
No. 38384 and House Report No. 807,65 the Tax Court held that the
significance of a reduction in plan participation should be judged in
relation to the size of the plan, not according to the absolute number of
persons eliminated from participation in the plan. 6
The court also opined that utilizing the significant number test
would disproportionately impact larger plans and would unnecessarily
complicate their administration.2 7 The court applied Revenue Ruling
81-2726 in illustration of this point. 269 Finally, the court concluded that
utilizing the significant number test would allow even minor corporate
events to fall within the partial termination rules, thereby turning the
partial termination vesting rule "into a mechanism for providing sever-
ance benefits instead of retirement benefits"-a purpose not intended
by Congress.2
In applying the significant percentage test, the court recognized
that there is no "magical figure at which a partial termination oc-
curs." 27 1 However, the court painstakingly attempted to make some
sense out of the 20 percent benchmark utilized by the Service 272 First,
the court recognized that a drop in participation of 20 percent or more
must be reported to the plan sponsor under section 4043(b)(3) of
ERISA.27 3 Further, the court noted the Service's use of the 20 percent
figure in its Plan Termination Handbook. 4 Finally, the court rea-
soned that the 20 percent number may have arisen from a pre-ERISA
annual report requirement which inquired about a drop in participation
" Id. House Report No. 807 specifically provides that "a large reduction in the work force"
will constitute a partial termination." H. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4731.
I" S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4935.
26 H. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4731.
*" Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216, 235 (1993).
267 Id.
2"6 Rev. Rul. 81-27, 1981-1 C.B. 228.
"" In Revenue Ruling 81-27, 95 out of 165 employees were excluded from participation in
the plan. Id. The IRS held that a partial termination did in fact occur. Id.
M0 Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. at 235 (citing 119 CONG. REc. 30,384-85
(1973) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
"' Id. at 236 n.8 (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 530
(E.D. Pa. 1986), aft'd, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987, and cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and
aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
171 Id. at 237 n.8.
'17 Id. (citing ERISA § 4043(b)(3) (1993)).
," Id. (citing IRS Plan Termination Handbook, supra note 26, at § 252).
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of 20 percent or more.2"' While sensitive to the Service's view, the
court properly rejected the 20 percent benchmark as an absolute
test,2 76 and correctly opted to apply the facts and circumstances stan-
dard outlined in the Regulations.
c. Defining the Class of Employees Affected
The parties agreed that certain classes of employees should be ex-
cluded from the significant percentage calculation. Employees ex-
cluded as a result of death, normal retirement, and terminations for
cause were not counted since these eliminations were not an affirmative
attempt by Halliburton to reduce covered employees. 27 8 In addition,
citing Gulf Pension, both parties eventually agreed to exclude plan par-
ticipants covered by a successor plan.27 9 Ultimately, the parties agreed
that the partially vested participants who were involuntarily terminated
in 1986 should be included in the calculation. 280 However, the parties
disagreed as to whether employees who voluntarily relinquished em-
ployment during 1986, due to either early retirement or voluntary res-
ignation, should be counted.28 '
The court agreed with Halliburton that only involuntary terminees
need be counted for purposes of determining the occurrence of a partial
termination.2 8 2 The court cited numerous cases in favor of this posi-
tion. 283 As further support, the court cited the Regulations for the pro-
275 Id. (citing LINDA M. LAARMAN & DAVID A. HILDEBRANDT, Plan Terminations And
Mergers, 357 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO A-18(2) (1986)).
276 Id. at 237. On this issue, the court specifically stated that it will "decline to accord talis-
manic significance to the 20 percent rule of thumb, but will regard the percentage drop in the
light of the other facts and circumstances." Id.
177 Id. at 238.
278 Id. See also In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 1991);
Morales v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1302-03 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d
83 (5th Cir. 1990).
278 Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 239. See Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1165-66.
280 Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 239.
282 Id. The IRS contended that both early retirements as well as voluntary resignations
should be counted. Id. Halliburton disagreed and stated that the partial termination rules were
intended only to protect plan participants who involuntarily separated from service. Id. at 239-40.
182 Id. at 240.
288 Id. See, e.g., Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Assocs., 860 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir.
1988); Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 891 (10th Cir. 1988); Kreis
v. Charles 0. Townley & Assocs., 833 F.2d 74, 79 (6th Cir. 1987); Weil 1, 750 F.2d 10, 11-13 (2d
Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5802 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988);
In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Morales v. Pan Am. Life
Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (E.D. La. 1989), aft'd, 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
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position that only employer-initiated dismissals can cause a vertical
partial termination. " ' However, the court opined that an employee res-
ignation may be counted as an employer-initiated dismissal if it can be
shown that the employee resigned due to intolerable working condi-
tions.2"' Further, if it is clear that the employee quit in anticipation of
being laid off and that the employee will not be able to return to work
for that employer, the employee is considered to have been involunta-
rily terminated.2 86 In sum, the court held that voluntary, non-employer-
initiated terminations are not included in deciding whether a partial
termination occurred.287
The court then examined whether employees who took Hallibur-
ton's offer of early retirement were constructively discharged.88 In an-
swering this question, the court noted that Halliburton's plan for down-
sizing was enacted voluntarily on a nationwide basis. 89 Because the
early retirement offer was made to all employees, and each employee
"was free to accept it or not," the court reasoned this was not a case
where the employees had no option but to leave the employ of the em-
ployer. 90 The court found that the employees were not constructively
discharged. Hence, the court held that employees who selected early
retirement should not be included in the calculation.29 1 The court fur-
ther concluded that an employee's decision to take the early retirement
benefit offered by Halliburton was the result of a careful weighing pro-
cess in which the employee weighed the benefits and burdens of ac-
cepting early retirement versus continuing his or her employment with
Halliburton.
I" Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 240 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(1) (1977)
("[S]everance by the employer" of plan participants)).
186 Id. (citing Kreis, 833 F.2d at 81-82).
*" Id. (citing Collignon v. Reporting Servs. Co., 796 F. Supp. 1136, 1141-42 (C.D. Ill.
1992); Morales, 718 F. Supp. at 1303).
257 Id. at 241.
2" Id.
289 Id.
'" Id. at 241-42. The court noted that almost every employee who left Halliburton com-
pleted a form indicating their reasons for leaving. id. at 242. No one indicated that he or she was
leaving because of an anticipated discharge or layoff. Id. Also, there is no evidence that any of the
commenting employees were compelled to falsely state that they were leaving voluntarily. Id. at
242 n.Il.
29* Id. at 242 (the court cited In re Gulf Pension Litigation, 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1168 (S.D.
Tex. 1991), for this proposition). The court reasoned that Halliburton merely made an offer of
early retirement to its employees. Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 242. The employees were free to reject
or accept the offer as they wished and were not coerced by Halliburton in any manner. Id. at 243.
See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964
(1987).
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In Halliburton, the court was also confronted with the issue of
whether fully vested employees laid off by Halliburton should be
counted in calculating the significant percentage reduction for the sig-
nificant percentage test.292 Halliburton argued that these participants
should be excluded,2 9 3 while the Commissioner asserted that they
should be counted.294 However, the court passed on this question, find-
ing it irrelevant in light of the determination that no partial termina-
tion occurred, 96 even when such employees were included.
Halliburton also argued that participants who had no accrued ben-
efits in the plan at the time of separation from service should be ex-
cluded from the calculation.296 The Commissioner, on the other hand,
urged that these participants be counted since, in the Service's opinion,
it is important to examine the reduction of plan participants as a whole,
without regard to their vesting status. 97 Once again, the court found
this inquiry irrelevant in light of its ultimate decision that a partial
termination did not occur.2 98 Nonetheless, the court included these in-
dividuals in the calculation purely for illustrative purposes.2 99
The Commissioner also contended that participants who were
transferred to Halliburton affiliates other than M-I should be included
in the calculation because such participants did not receive adequate
vesting protection.300 The court disagreed, however, based on the fact
that a participant's transfer did not cause him or her to lose vesting
credit since the employee was allowed credit under the Plan for service
to the affiliate.3"' Hence, the court concluded that these transferees
should not be part of the affected class.30 2
219 Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 243-44.
293 Id. at 244. Specifically, Halliburton argued that the purpose of the partial termination
rule was to protect participants from forfeiting rights to accrued, but unvested benefits and to
prevent employers from recognizing a windfall because of the reversion of funds on which the
employer had paid no tax. Id. Halliburton asserted that these policy concerns would not be ad-
vanced by placing participants who forfeit nothing upon leaving the plan into the significant per-
centage calculation. Id.
I" Id. The Commissioner specifically asserted that the "significant contraction of [the] plan"
is the focus of the partial termination inquiry, not the consequences of such event. Id.
295 Id.
I" Id. at 244-45.
297 Id. at 245.
298 Id.
209 Id. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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During 1987 through 1989, several former participants in the Hal-
liburton Plan who had been involuntarily separated from service were
rehired and subsequently became participants in the plan.303 Hallibur-
ton urged that such participants be excluded from the percentage re-
duction calculation.304 The Service, on the other hand, argued that the
only significant year for the determination was 1986.805 Permitting the
exclusion of these employees, the Service opined, would only further
complicate the decision-making process for finding a partial termina-
tion.306 The court resolved the issue by citing the Gulf Pension case for
the proposition that events affecting whether a partial termination has
occurred can cover more than one year.307
Finally, Halliburton argued that the partial termination rules ap-
ply only in the case of a permanent, rather than a temporary, reduction
in plan participation as was the case here.308 The court agreed with
Halliburton's analysis after examining all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances.30 9 The court stated "that [to hold that] a large drop in
plan participation, no matter how short in duration, could cause a par-
tial termination would greatly and unnecessarily complicate the admin-
istration of plans and would needlessly discourage their establish-
ment."3 '' The court reasoned that there are times when temporary
30 Id. One thousand two hundred seventy-nine employees recommenced employment with
Halliburton during this time. Id. at 245-46 n.13.
I" Id. at 246. Halliburton reasoned that these employees only experienced temporary layoffs




'07 Id. See In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 1991). The court
did address the Service's concerns that considering rehired individuals will complicate and further
delay the process of determining that a partial termination has occurred. Halliburton, 100 T.C. at
247-48. The IRS noted that an employee may be rehired as long as five years later and still be
eligible for restoration of his or her forfeited account balance. Id. at 248. The court had little
difficulty negating the Service's concerns. The court recognized that truly temporary reductions in
the workforce of an employer are periods of time shorter than the five year period raised by the
Service. Id. Further, the more time that goes by, the greater the likelihood that the employee will
find new employment with another employer. Id. Therefore, the former employees will not be
eligible to be rehired by the employer. Id. In this case, the majority of the individuals were rehired
in 1987, while only a few were rehired in 1988. Id. The court concluded that rehiring within this
short time frame further proved that the reduction in participants was only temporary and did not
constitute a partial termination. Id.
' Halliburton, 100 T.C. at 246.
309 Id. at 247.
$10 Id.
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layoffs are a necessary and a normal part of business practice. " ' Such
was the situation here since the oil industry was near collapse. 1,
The authors believe the Halliburton court adopted the correct
view. The Tax Court adhered to the applicable regulatory language
and examined all of the surrounding facts and circumstances in the
case. For example, the court noted that toward the end of 1986, the
price of oil was beginning to rise, thereby creating the need to increase
Halliburton's workforce. " ' The number of operating rigs also began to
rise in conjunction with the rise of the oil prices. 3" The court thus
correctly concluded that there was a direct relation between the econ-
omy of the oil industry and Halliburton's reduction, and then subse-
quent increase, in its workforce.
d. Calculation of the Significant Percentage Fraction





Zero Balance Accounts 231
5,015
Less:
Rehired Involuntarily Separated Participants
Fully Vested 45
Partially Vested 1,039
Zero Balanced Accounts 40
(1,124)
NET REDUCTION IN PARTICIPATION 3,891
311 Id.
812 Id.
313 Id. at 248.
d14 Id.
31 The court included fully vested and zero balance participants in the calculation, but did
so only for illustrative purposes. Id. at 250-51. As noted above, the court made no decision as to
whether these individuals should be counted in making the determination that a partial termina-
tion has occurred. Id.
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The Net Reduction in Participation constituted the numerator. 316 The
denominator, 19,598, was calculated by adding all the participants in
the Halliburton Plan on January 1, 1986 to the participants that en-
tered the Plan during 1986.317 The result was 19.85 percent, which the
court concluded was not "significant" for partial termination
purposes.318
VI. OBSERVATIONS
The Halliburton court's rejection of the 20 percent absolute stan-
dard that prior courts utilized is refreshing and completely justified.
There is no statutory basis for applying the 20 percent standard, espe-
cially as an absolute threshold. To the contrary, the mechanical appli-
cation of that figure negates the true intent of the statute and its legis-
lative history. While a benchmark standard may be one fact to be
examined within the facts and circumstances test, such a standard
should not constitute an absolute test.
Unequivocally, the Service's purpose for devising the significant
percentage and significant number tests was to create both a standard
that can be easily applied by affected parties and a neutral mechanism
for making the determination relative to whether a partial termination
has occurred. However, an examination of the case law in this area
indicates that those courts which have relied only upon the significant
percentage test generally do not find a partial termination.
Case law is indicative of the holding of the majority of the courts
in failing to find a partial termination. In applying the significant per-
centage test, courts seem to simply perform a numerical calculation on
a nationwide basis (i.e. compare the number of plan participants on a
nationwide basis before the alleged partial termination to the number
of participants after the alleged partial termination took place). How-
ever, as can easily be seen by examining any of the cases that have
addressed the partial termination issue, when the test is applied, the
result is substantially the same. If the ratio exceeds 20 percent-the
Service's published benchmark standard 19 -a partial termination will
810 Id. at 251.
817 Id.
818 Id.
"' The IRS seems to indicate that a 20 percent reduction in plan participants is the bench-
mark for determining that a partial termination has occurred. IRS Plan Termination Handbook,
supra note 26, Pt. VII, Ch. 7950-51.
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be deemed to have occurred. 2 We provide the following example in
illustration of this point.
Assume that all the plan participants of a division of a large com-
pany are terminated. If the number of plan participants in a single
division is relatively small when compared to the number of plan par-
ticipants on a nationwide basis, the possibility of calculating a percent-
age in excess of 20 percent is remote and a court would be unlikely to
find a partial termination. Such a result would fly in the face of con-
gressional intent because it would not protect the dismissed plan par-
ticipants. On the other hand, dismissed plan participants would obtain
a more equitable result if the courts would simply apply a divisional
analysis as opposed to a nationwide analysis. If the courts utilized a
divisional analysis in all circumstances, it is likely that the terminees
would virtually always achieve full vesting status because a partial ter-
mination would be found. Therefore, one problem with the approach of
many courts in making a partial termination determination is the appli-
cation of the partial termination rules on a nationwide basis as opposed
to a divisional analysis.
However, an analysis of the nationwide participation may not be a
problem if the number of plan participants in a single division is not
small in relation to the total number of plan participants within the
corporate organization. For example, 21 assume that a holding company
has four divisions-A, B, C, and D-with each division's employees
participating in the pension plan of the holding company. The plan has
200 participants. Division A, Division B, Division C and Division D
have participants in the plan of 60, 30, 10 and 100, respectively. If
Division D is sold and all the plan participants are eliminated, the plan
will have incurred a partial termination on both a divisional and na-
tionwide analysis according to the Service's 20 percent benchmark
There is no explanation for this arbitrary 20 percent figure. A possible explanation may be
that the PBGC uses 20 percent as the reportable event number. ERISA §§ 4043(b)(3), 4062(e)
(1993). A "reportable event" for Title IV purposes is a 20 percent reduction in the number of
plan participants in a plan year or a 25 percent reduction in a period of two plan years. Id.
However, there is no compelling reason why the 20 percent threshold designed to assist the PBGC
in identifying underfunded plans that may qualify for involuntary termination should have any
link to the partial termination question.
310 See supra note 113.
3,1 This example is discussed utilizing a nationwide, as opposed to single, corporate, division
standard since such standard has been used by numerous courts which have addressed this issue.
See infra notes 322-29 and accompanying text. While the authors do not advocate the Service's 20
percent benchmark standard as the sole means for determining that a partial termination has
occurred, this standard is utilized for simplicity in this example.
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standard since the reduction in plan participants is 50 percent. How-
ever, if Divisions B or C are sold independently, the Service would not
view this as a partial termination since the Service applies the nation-
wide analysis. Under a divisional analysis a partial termination is more
likely to be found.
The aforementioned example exemplifies the need for courts to ap-
ply the statutory facts and circumstances test in order to reach overall
just decisions. The partial termination rules are not well-suited to abso-
lute standards. An equitable result cannot consistently be reached
utilizing a nationwide analysis in every instance. In some instances, the
nationwide analysis produces the best result, while in others the single
corporate divisional analysis is more equitable. As is shown in the ex-
ample above, the Service may find that the closing of one division is a
partial termination and determine that the closing of another division
within the same company is not a partial termination. This is inequita-
ble since the closing of one division will result in those participants
becoming fully vested, while the participants of the other division do
not receive equal protection.
The case law in this area further illustrates the point. In Beck v.
Shaw Industries3122 the plaintiffs were terminated when the company
sold one of its carpet plants.323 The plaintiffs argued that the carpet
plant should be considered a separate division.3 2" The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, however, and using a nationwide analysis, held
that the plant was merely a part of the company's carpet division.325 If
the court had adopted the plaintiffs' assertions, a partial termination
would unequivocally have been deemed to occur. While the decision
does not indicate the exact number of participants that would have
been included if the carpet plant were considered a separate division,
the percentage reduction in plan participants would have been signifi-
cantly greater than the 6.2 percent decrease which the court found.
326
Similarly, Taylor v. Food Giant, Inc. Salaried Employees Pension
Plan3 27 involved the sale of one of the company's divisions. The court,
following Beck, held that a divisional analysis like the one suggested by
22 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2366 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
323 Id. at 2367.
324 id. at 2368.
32 Id.
... In Beck, 100 employees out of a total of 1,599 were discharged from employment and
consequently from participating in the plan. Id. at 2367.
21 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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the plaintiffs was not appropriate.328 As in Beck, if the court had ac-
cepted the plaintiffs' proposals, it almost certainly would have found a
partial termination based upon the discharge of 44 out of 50 division
employees. 2 9 Moreover, in Ehm v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,330 the court
also looked to participants nationwide and concluded that a reduction
of 2.5 percent of plan participants did not constitute a partial
termination.
In Weil I, all of Ward's New York operations were closed due to a
reorganization. 3" That closing resulted in a 62 percent reduction of
plan participants in New York. 32 However, the Weil I court held that
a partial termination did not occur because the court concluded that
the reorganization resulted in a termination of only 27 percent of the
plan's active participants nationwide.33 3 This 27 percent reduction did
not meet the threshold rates in the revenue rulings relied upon by the
court.33' However, the court revisited the issue in Weil IP3 5 and
reached a different result. After examining the effect a partial termina-
tion determination would have on plan participants rather than the ef-
fect on the company, the court calculated the percentage reduction ex-
clusively for the New York division and found a partial termination.336
The Weil II court, in applying a divisional analysis versus the nation-
wide analysis, caused the plan to fully vest all of the terminees.
The authors submit that the choice between the two analyses is an
element of the facts and circumstances test. In some instances, choos-
ing the divisional analysis and finding a partial termination may in es-
sence be more harmful to the remaining plan participants and the em-
ployer due to the combination of the increased costs of litigating this
issue33 7 and the terrific cost of vesting all terminated employees. 8  In
328 Id. at 1294.
329 Id. at 1291.
330 583 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Kan. 1984).
W31 eil I, 750 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5802 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15, 1988).
332 Id.
133 Id. at II.
84, Id. at 12.
335 Weil II, 933 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1991).
13 Id. at 110.
33" Depending on the circumstances and the plan language, the costs of litigation could be
paid out of the fund's assets, which will thereby decrease the total amount of assets available to be
paid as benefits to the participants of the plan. Whether or not the cost of litigation is paid out of
plan assets, the employer effectively pays the bill.
8" The costs of vesting all terminated plan participants varies depending on the number of
participants and the extent to which they were already vested. Forcing an employer to vest all
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other cases, however, the divisional analysis may not drastically harm
the employer, plan or participants. These authors do not believe that
Congress intended to force employers into such high costs as a means
for providing pension benefits. Taken as a whole, all of the above exam-
ples illustrate the need for courts and the Service to apply a facts and
circumstances test.
Indeed, Congress specifically mandated that a "facts and circum-
stances" test be controlling in this area. Neither the statute, nor the
governing Regulations provide for the utilization of the significant per-
centage test in all cases. On the contrary, neither the statute nor its
legislative history mentions numerical tests. The significant percentage
test is merely an arbitrary rule created by the IRS, presumably, to give
some credence to the ad hoc determinations of the IRS district offices
and field agents. The usefulness of the Service's 20 percent benchmark
standard derives from its uniformity and ability to provide employers
with a steadfast rule. However, the legislative history and governing
Treasury Regulations specifically and repeatedly state that a facts and
circumstances test is to be utilized. Thus, courts lack adequate justifi-
cation to completely omit the only test outlined by statute.
As the Bishop of London stated in a sermon delivered before the
King in 1715: "[W]hoever hath absolute Authority to interpret any
written, or spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all
Intents and Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke the
Law."33 9 This quote is illustrative of the need for constraint on the ju-
diciary's ability to "legislate" under the guise of legislative interpreta-
tion. Some would argue that the role of the federal judiciary is and
always has been an activist one.34 0 However, great legal scholars who
such employees could economically harm the employer to the point that a complete termination
would occur. This would be harmful to all involved.
839 HOADLEY, THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM OR CHURCH OF CHRIST 12 (1717).
840 For example, Judge Frank M. Johnson, a United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Alabama, who is well-known for his civil rights decisions, such as Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ala. 1968), Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D.
Ala. 1965); and Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), and
reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 950 (1956), holds such a view. Specifically with regard to this issue Judge
Johnson stated: "While refusal to show proper deference to and respect for the acts and decisions
of the coordinate branches of government is judicial intrusion and is, therefore, improper, a blind
and unyielding deference to legislative and executive action is judicial abdication and is equally to
be condemned." Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., John A. Sibley Lecture: The Role of the
Judiciary With Respect to the Other Branches of Government, I I GA. L. REv. 455, 469 (1977).
The activism Johnson describes is not properly measured in terms of the end result, but by the
means through which the result is achieved. Id. In Johnson's opinion, judicial activism is not
"activism" at all but is a display of the court's "continuing duty to uphold the law." Id. at 474.
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were instrumental in laying the foundation for legal jurisprudence have
condemned such activism. 3 1' In addition, Justices Holmes and Cardozo,
who acknowledged that judges must be permitted to legislate, believed
that this judicial legislation should occur only through gap-filling-that
judges must supply what the current law omits.3 42
In the case of alleged partial terminations, there is no need for
gap-filling. The statute clearly spells out the intent of Congress-the
test to be utilized in determining whether a partial termination has oc-
curred is a facts and circumstances test. The statute requires no analy-
sis of percentages. If the statute is to have meaning, it must be applied
as it is written without the interjection of arbitrary absolute tests,
which in effect undermine those tests specifically identified by statute.
Undeniably, the percentage of excluded plan participants is a fac-
tor that should be considered when making a determination that a par-
tial termination has occurred. 43 The percentage, at times, may be so
"significant" that it may be the overwhelming factor in applying the
facts and circumstances test and may ultimately lead the court to con-
clude a partial termination has indeed occurred.4 However, the calcu-
lated percentage should not be the exclusive factor. It is necessary to
look beyond mere percentages in making the partial termination deter-
mination. Thus, a facts and circumstances test-the only test deline-
ated in the statute-must be given priority.
Unfortunately, courts which have addressed this issue have dis-
played different views. For example, in Peter M. Boruta,3" the Tax
84' Indeed, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, concluded
that judges should not use personal judgment when making legal determinations, but should just
follow the known laws and customs of the land unless the law is "manifestly absurd or unjust." I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (1897). Similarly, as
Bacon stated: "Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to
interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS, OF JUDICATURE. Fi-
nally, as Justice Coleridge noted: "We must not be guilty of taking the law into our own hands,
and converting it from what it really is to what we think it ought to be." R. v. Ramsey, I C. & E.
126, 136 (1883).
842 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUdICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921);
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 6 (1977).
34' See Babb v. Olney Paint Co., 764 F.2d 240, 243-45 (4th Cir. 1985); Wei? 1, 750 F.2d 10,
13 (2d Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 82 Civ. 8468, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5802 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 15,
1988); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 1986), cert.
granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), and affid in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Taylor v.
Food Giant, Inc. Salaried Employees Pension Plan, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1291 (N.D.
Ga. 1984).
U4 See Bruch, 640 F. Supp. at 530-31; Ehm v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 583 F. Supp. 1113,
1115-16 (D. Kan. 1984).
848 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 670 (1988).
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Court asserted that the termination of two-thirds of a plan's partici-
pants "standing alone, generally is sufficient to warrant a finding of a
partial termination." s46 Further, the court stated that "facts and cir-
cumstances" need only be considered when the percentage reduction is
so small that the inference of a partial termination is not automatic.""7
This is clearly contrary to congressional intent.
As noted above, courts that have addressed the partial termination
issue have not discussed horizontal partial terminations with great em-
phasis. However, because the Gulf Pension case introduced the hori-
zontal partial termination concept, a brief mention is merited.
Whether a court labels the partial termination horizontal or verti-
cal, this finding renders the same result-the participants vest to the
extent the plan is funded.34 8 However the Gulf Pension result is note-
worthy for two reasons. First, the Gulf Pension case involves not only
the cutting off of accrued benefits, but the elimination of ancillary ben-
efits. Under the Regulations, if the employer cuts off all of the accru-
als, there is a partial termination and the employer would have to vest
the participants to the extent funded.3 49 However, neither the statute
nor accompanying Regulations makes any mention of ancillary bene-
fits. Nonetheless, the Gulf Pension court considered both ancillary ben-
efits and accrued benefits in making its determination that a partial
termination had occurred.""
Second, the value of the ancillary benefits at issue in Gulf Pension
was approximately 10 percent. 51 Under the Service's benchmark stan-
dard, a vertical partial termination requires a reduction or elimination
of 20 percent of benefits in order to be considered "significant" under
the significant percentage test. 52 No IRS rulings or case law prescribe
a benchmark standard for determining when courts and the IRS will
deem a horizontal partial termination to have occurred. In light of this
fact, the results announced by the Gulf Pension court are both enlight-
ening and confusing.
Arguably one would expect vertical and horizontal partial termi-
nations to be determined utilizing different standards since they are
labeled as two distinct types of partial terminations. The Gulf Pension
1,6 Id. at 670.
47 Id.
848 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b)(1) (1963).
349 Id.
80 In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1177-79 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
381 Id. at 1174-75.
"I See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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court affirmatively applied a different standard for determining the oc-
currence of each type of partial termination. The court used the Ser-
vice's 20 percent benchmark standard in determining whether a verti-
cal partial termination occurred, and found no partial termination since
the percentage reduction in plan participants was less than the bench-
mark. However, the court concluded that a reduction in ancillary bene-
fits of less than 20 percent constituted a horizontal partial termina-
tion.353 Gulf Pension thus appears to set forth a different standard for
each type of partial termination and this may be appropriate if the two
are truly distinctive.
Nonetheless, the distinction between both types of partial termina-
tions remains unclear because the court did not adequately address the
standards that should apply to horizontal partial terminations. Confu-
sion is caused by the court's failure to provide guidance as to whether
there are separate horizontal partial termination rules. If such rules
exist, it is unclear whether they mirror the vertical partial termination
rules in part or in toto. If the horizontal and vertical partial termina-
tion rules are intended to mirror each other, of what relevance is the
distinction?
One must also question whether ERISA section 204(h) is affected
by the Gulf Pension decision. Section 204(h) requires that a plan give
fifteen days advance notice that the plan intends to adopt amendments
that reduce future accruals. " Section 204(h) provides further that the
notice must be given before the amendments become effective. " How-
ever, several questions remain unanswered. First, is the test for partial
termination the same if the employer reduces ancillary benefits and not
accrued benefits? Second, is 10 percent35 6 "significant" for section
204(h) purposes? Third, does section 204(h) apply at all if an accrual
is not involved? At the present time, these questions remain to be
decided.
The policy reasons behind ERISA and the enactment of section
411 of the Code were to protect pension benefits promised employees
by their employers and to ease congressional and public concern that
employers would discharge substantial numbers of plan participants in
order to recognize a windfall.3 57 As noted above, the Service's or a
151 In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
.. See ERISA § 204(h) (1993).
355 Id.
" See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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court's finding that a partial termination has occurred causes partici-
pants to fully vest to the extent funded.388 This result furthers the con-
gressional intent of protecting pension benefits.
Nonetheless, the achievement of this result is costly to the em-
ployer. In today's economy, numerous employers are experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties. An employer who is required to reduce the size of
its workforce due to monetary constraints will not have the ability to
vest participants to the extent they are affected by the partial termina-
tion. Further, because the standards articulated by both the courts as
well as the Service remain far from clear or uniform, the costs of liti-
gating these partial termination claims by plan participants are often
significant. The filing fees involved in receiving an IRS determination
letter further increase the costs to employers. Filing for an IRS deter-
mination letter on this issue generally increases litigation costs because
the Service does not follow the approach set forth by the courts, and a
party who receives an adverse decision is likely to litigate the matter.
In essence, the unclear partial termination rules impose much greater
costs, not only to the employer, but ultimately to the plan participants,
than would the mere vesting of participants to the extent funded.
Litigation is ignited by the inconsistent approaches taken by the
courts on this issue and the Service's ad hoc determinations relative to
the many issues underlying the partial termination evaluation. One
such inconsistency is the definition of the allowable time span encom-
passing the corporate event. The Service adheres to the rule that a cor-
porate event can only occur on a calendar or fiscal year basis.3 59 In
8" Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b)(1) (1963).
a" This proposition is best illustrated by Form 5300 which the Service requires be completed
before a determination on the partial termination issue can be rendered. The relevant portion of
the Form 5300 is as follows:
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Gulf Pension, however, the court opined that there is no time limit in
defining the length of the corporate event.3 60
While Congress had admirable intentions of protecting the benefits
of terminated plan participants when it enacted the partial termination
rules, the costs of the legislation are detrimental not only to the em-
ployer, but ultimately to the plan and the plan participants as well.
Hence, the rules may deter employers from initiating pension plans due
to the fear of overwhelming costs. Without a defined set of rules in this
area to reduce the threats and costs of litigation, congressional inten-
tions to provide pension benefits to participants may not be served
overall.
CONCLUSION
Even though the partial termination concept has existed in the
Code for over three decades, no clear guidelines exist for determining
when courts and the IRS will deem a partial termination of a single-
employer plan to have occurred. Over that thirty year period, numerous
courts as well as the IRS have addressed the partial termination issue.
Without adequate guidelines, however, the result has been a plethora of
inconsistent and arbitrary determinations. These inconsistencies indi-
cate that the IRS has not provided sufficient guidance and the courts
have failed to develop uniform principles for determining whether a
partial termination has occurred. In order to resolve this dilemma, the
Year of partial
termination
Partial Termination Worksheet 19.... 19.... 19.... 19....
I Participants employed:
a Number at beginning of plan year
b Number added during the plan year
e Total, add lines a and b
d Number dropped during the plan year
e Number at end of plan year, subtract d from e
f Total number of participants in this plan separated
from service without full vesting





3 Submit a description of the actions that may have resulted (or might result) in a partial termination.
Include an explanation of how the plan meets the requirements of section 411 (d)(3).
In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 1149, 1167-70 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
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IRS must develop more precise rules so that inconsistencies between
the Treasury Regulations, case law and IRS revenue rulings are recti-
fied. If the IRS wishes to utilize an absolute numerical test, then one
must be outlined in the statute or accompanying Regulations. Until
that time, courts are left to decipher the "facts and circumstances"
standard, or not.
